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ABSTRACT
Method and Interpretation: Gadamer and the Limits of
Methods in Qualitative Research
Jared C. Parker
Department of Psychology, BYU
Doctor of Philosophy
Qualitative modes of research have been working their way into the mainstream of
psychological research. Unfortunately, social psychology has largely resisted this trend, despite
the particular utility of qualitative research for investigating social phenomena. Curiously, as
qualitative research becomes more widely accepted in psychology, much of the discourse
surrounding these approaches has revolved around the procedural dimensions of qualitative
inquiry. Specifically, it has focused on developing, describing, and defending various codified
approaches to qualitative data analysis. Recently, this methodological paradigm has come under
some criticism, with scholars critiquing codified methods as leading to shallow, superficial, and
formulaic research. Others have noted that qualitative research requires a type of reasoning that
does not fit well with codified methods. To analyze this latter point, this paper appeals to the
hermeneutic philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer to identify the type of reasoning required by
qualitative work (i.e., interpretive understanding) and show how this type of reasoning relates to
codified methods. Through this analysis, it is shown that methods are unable to function as
specific procedures or concrete rules in qualitative practice, and that there are substantive
disadvantages in using them as general guidelines as well. An alternative mode of practice is
described, focusing on the cultivation of hermeneutical imagination.
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Method and Interpretation: Gadamer and the Limits of Methods in Qualitative Research
Recent decades have shown a dramatic uptick in interest among psychologists in
qualitative approaches to research, strongly suggesting that qualitative research is becoming
more widely accepted in the discipline. Evidence for this can be seen in a recent explosion of
outlets for qualitative work in psychology (including an APA journal: Qualitative Psychology), a
proliferation of textbooks and handbooks teaching qualitative methods (including a handbook
published by the APA: Camic et al., 2003), and the establishment of professional organizations
and conferences for qualitative researchers in psychology (see, e.g., Gough & Lyons, 2016;
Wertz, 2011; Wertz et al., 2011).
Indeed, in their review, Carrera-Fernandez et al. (2014) found that the number of
qualitative studies published in psychological journals has increased steadily since the 1990s
from 12 published studies in 1990 to 171 in 1999 to 529 in 2010. More recently, the APA
reporting standards working group published a landmark article in the APA flagship journal
American Psychologist outlining reporting standards for qualitative research (Levitt et al., 2018).
As the authors note, the article marked “a historical moment” for the APA: “the first inclusion of
qualitative research in APA Style” (i.e., the style guide which is the basis for the APA
publication manual; p. 26).
Qualitative Research and Social Psychology
Curiously, social psychology has largely resisted these trends. Indeed, as several scholars
have pointed out, the field continues to privilege “quantified data and statistical analysis over
qualitative data” (Power et al., 2018, p. 360; see also Fine & Elsbach, 2000; King, 2004;
Marecek et al., 1997). To verify this, I searched four top-tiered social psychology journals (i.e.,
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Social Psychological and Personality Science,
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Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin) for
qualitative research published since 2011. Following Marchel and Owens’ (2007), I searched
these journals for terms associated with qualitative work 1 and reviewed the abstracts of articles
revealed by the search, noting articles that clearly included qualitative elements.
While my initial search produced 65 hits, a small minority (7) of these articles mentioned
qualitative modes of analysis in their abstracts. Furthermore, of these seven studies, only three
were qualitative in a strong sense; that is, only three of the articles were mainly qualitative rather
than merely using interviews to corroborate experimental findings or develop a psychological
instrument (for more in-depth analyses of the uptake of qualitative work in mainstream
psychology journals see Carrera-Fernandez et al., 2014; Kidd, 2002; Rennie et al., 2002).
While this review has its limitations (e.g., it is possible that some of the rejected articles
included qualitative elements but failed to mention them in the abstract or keywords), it gives a
rough sense for the relationship between qualitative methods and the mainstream of social
psychology, and it corroborates Power et al.’s (2018) assertion that “qualitative and mixedmethods research is rarely featured in premier social psychology journals” (p. 359). 2
Social psychologists’ reticence to embrace qualitative research is unfortunate,
considering the benefits qualitative modes of inquiry could bring to social psychological research

I used the same 11 search terms used by Marchel and Owens (2007) in their review: qualitative, ethnography,
discourse analysis, action research, grounded theory, phenomenology, ethnomethodology, life history, case study,
participant observation, and autoethnography. These terms were searched for in article titles, abstracts, and
keywords.
1

This is not meant to imply that qualitative research has had no part in the development of social psychology. To the
contrary, as Marecek et al. (1997) note, social psychology has always included qualitative work. Indeed, much of the
groundbreaking work of luminaries like John Dollard (e.g., 1937), Kurt Lewin (e.g., 1948), Phillip Zimbardo (e.g.,
Zimbardo et al., 1974), and Leon Festinger (e.g., Festinger et al., 1956) was qualitative and descriptive. The point of
this analysis is to show how, despite the influence of these researchers and their work, qualitative research is still
undervalued in social psychology.
2
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and theorizing. Indeed, researchers have long argued that qualitative research should be a central
element of psychological science (see, e.g., Allport, 1942; Gergen et al., 2015; Gough & Lyons,
2016; O'Neill, 2002; Riley et al., 2019; Wundt, 1900), and others have described how social
psychology in particular would benefit from a greater emphasis on qualitative work (see, e.g.,
Brown & Locke, 2017; Fine & Elsbach, 2000; Gantt, 2005; Henwood & Parker, 1994; Marecek
et al., 1997; King, 2004). While these scholars describe many benefits qualitative research might
bring to social psychology, I will highlight and expand on three.
Qualitative Research Makes Social Psychology More Scientific
One reason social psychology has been reticent to embrace qualitative methods is
psychologists’ preconceptions about the nature of properly scientific methods. As scholars have
shown, social psychologists, perhaps more than other sub-disciplines of psychology, associate
the scientific method with quantification and laboratory experimentation (see, e.g., Brannigan,
2002, 2004; Danziger, 1992; Danziger, 2000; Jahoda, 2016; Michell, 2003, 2010; Stam et al.,
2000). Indeed, as Rozin (2001) notes, early social psychologists fixated on becoming “a formal,
precise, and experimental science” (p. 3) patterned after the natural sciences and sensory
psychology. The presumption of many social psychologists has been that “experimentation is the
key to objective knowledge, and is superior to rival methodologies, at least in principle”
(Brannigan, 2004, p. 1).
However, as Rozin (2001) argues, social psychologists’ association of the natural
sciences with experimentation, quantification, and hypothesis testing is a “misinterpretation of
the approach of the basic natural sciences” (p. 3). Indeed, while many of the more established
natural sciences do include experimentation and hypothesis testing, Rozin (2001) argues that “in
the more advanced sciences that social psychology would like to emulate, there is much more
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emphasis on phenomena and ‘description’ than there is in social psychology, and there is less
reliance on experiment” (p. 3). Indeed, for Rozin (2001), social psychology is less than it could
be because it became “prematurely formal and experimental” without having taken sufficient
time to discover and describe its basic phenomena (for similar critiques, see Asch, 1952/1987;
Brannigan, 2004; Gantt, 2005; Gantt, et al., 2017; Greenwood, 2004). As Gaddis (2002) has
noted:
Social scientists seem to have concluded that the only way they can both explain the
past and anticipate the future is to imitate the laboratory sciences. ... They feel that
they've not done their job until they've separated independent variables from dependent
variables. But they do so only by separating these variables from the world that
surrounds them. (p. 60)
Ultimately, the epistemological requirements of the experimental/quantitative approach to social
psychological study demand that researchers search out a world of variables and constructs
operating behind the manifestly meaningful world of ordinary human experience that “surrounds
them.” However, as Gantt and Williams (2020) observe, “a long-standing requirement of
scientific inquiry is that science must ‘save the phenomena’ or else it fails as legitimate science
and devolves into little more than an ideological exercise” (p. 93). Unfortunately, mainstream
social psychology’s rigid adherence to the strictures of experimental method and quantitative
analysis may seriously inhibit its ability to fruitfully and faithfully investigate its primary subject
matter (i.e., human social action and relationships) as well as render its theoretical accounts
impotent and misleading.
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Thus, for many critics, the way forward for social psychologists is to follow the example
of the natural sciences by beginning with “careful description and establishment of functional
relationships” (Rozin, 2009, p. 438). In a similar vein, Gantt and Williams (2020) argue that by
opening ourselves up to possible alternative epistemological possibilities, alternatives that
would permit us to engage the saturated phenomena of meaningful human experience as
lived more directly and sensitively, rather than forcing such phenomena to fit into overly
restrictive and distorting pre-selected conceptual boxes, we might then perhaps begin to
provide richer and more fertile accounts of lived-experience – accounts that might accord
more deeply with the experiences of actual persons. (pp. 99-100)
Obviously, qualitative approaches to research are not the only approaches suited to this
task—exploratory and descriptive work can be quantitative too—however, as Yarkoni (2019)
notes, “given that the theories and constructs psychologists are interested in usually have
qualitative origins, and are almost invariably expressed verbally” 3 it makes sense that qualitative
research would be an indispensable element of the type of research that Rozin recommends.
Ironically, rather than making social psychology less scientific as some psychologists might
suppose, the incorporation of more descriptive qualitative research would bring the field more
closely in line with the more well-established sciences. Indeed, as Michell (2010) shows, “the
use of qualitative methods in psychological research is not only justified [but] that qualitative
methods are, on purely scientific grounds, not to be preferred any less than quantitative methods”
(p. 64).

For example, in their “native habitat,” phenomena like opinions are qualitative, that is, they are not experienced or
expressed in terms of numerical quantity. If one were to ask someone their opinion of the current president, for
example, it is highly unlikely that they would respond with a number.

3
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Qualitative Research and External Validity
As noted above, social psychology has historically associated the scientific method
almost entirely with experimental research. Indeed, as Stam et al. (2000) describe, “by the 1960s
experimentation had become such an identifying feature of psychological social psychology that
the acceptability of ideas in the field came to depend largely on the ability of authors to couch
them in the language of the experiment” (p. 365). However, as many scholars have noted,
experimentation has both strengths and weaknesses (see Mortensen & Cialdini, 2010; Power et
al., 2018; Diener et al., 2022).
As Mortensen and Cialdini (2010) describe, laboratory experimentation gives researchers
precision and control, but this often comes at the expense of real-world applicability. More
specifically, although laboratory research “allows social scientists to carefully remove or control
variables,” clarify relationships between variables, and better understand mediating processes,
none of this “[serves] to indicate the strength or prevalence of phenomena in natural settings.”
Furthermore, statistical significance “[does] not indicate the real-world significance,” and effect
sizes only measure the size of effects “within the specific conditions set up in a lab” (p. 54).
Traditionally, psychologists have conceptualized this (i.e., the relation between research
findings and the real world) in terms of external validity—the extent to which findings generalize
beyond the setting in which they were found. Thus, a good experiment has the potential to clarify
relationships between variables in a laboratory setting, however, this often comes at the expense
of external validity. Given the field’s overreliance on experimentation, for some time now, social
psychologists have worried that the field might be gaining precision and control at the expense of
relevance. Indeed, going back to the 1960s and 70s, social psychologists have worried “whether
social psychology research can be relevant to anyone but social psychologists” or whether it can
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“create solutions to real-world social problems” (Giner-Sorolla, 2019, p. 1; see also, Silverman,
1971). More recently, Diener et al. (2022) have argued, citing concerns with external validity,
that “experiments are overused and overvalued in the behavioral sciences to the detriment of
scientific progress” (p. 1).
Recently, scholars have argued that qualitative research might help address these
shortcomings. Specifically, they have argued that, used alongside traditional quantitative
experimental work, qualitative research can help to overcome the limitations inherent in
laboratory research. Mortensen and Cialdini (2010), for example, argue for what they call a “fullcycle approach” to social psychology research (see also, Cialdini, 1980). In a full-cycle approach
to research,
researchers use naturalistic observation to determine an effect’s presence in the real
world, theory to determine what processes underlie the effect, experimentation to verify
the effect and its underlying processes, and a return to the natural environment to
corroborate the experimental findings (p. 53).
Mortensen and Cialdini assert that this mode of research is a model that can guide
researchers to produce “ecologically valid basic research” which can go on to be applied to solve
real problems (p. 54). The sort of naturalistic observation for which they advocate need not be
exclusively qualitative; however, as stated above, given the qualitative nature of many
psychological phenomena, qualitative methods would be well-suited to this type of work. 4

It is also worth noting the ways in which Mortensen and Cialdini’s (2010) ideas are an extension of how many
psychologists go about their research in the first place. That is, social psychologists often get ideas for their work
from observations of the natural world (see, e.g., Festinger et al., 1956). Mortensen and Cialdini merely advocate
more rigorous and systematic descriptive work on the front end of research and extending this practice onto the back
end of research, completing the cycle by “looking back to naturally occurring situations to assess the match between
the characteristics of the effect as it appeared in our studies versus how it appears in the real world” (p. 55).
4
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Power et al., (2018) have also argued along these lines, advocating for what they call a
“synthetic approach” to social psychology research which “continually and consistently uses
different methodologies [i.e., quantitative and qualitative] to check assumptions, research
questions, findings, and interpretations” (p. 362). They go on to assert that by doing so, “answers
to pressing questions can be triangulated… [and] the limitations of a single method can be
overcome” leading to “more nuanced, replicable, and ecologically valid research findings” (p.
362).
Qualitative Methods and Social Phenomena
Another side effect of social psychologists’ over-reliance on experimentation has been a
contraction of the types of phenomena to which the field attends. As Rozin (2001) has noted,
“almost the entire field is devoted to studying a modest subset of the domains of social life with a
limited range of salient methodologies” (p. 3). Indeed, he argues that the field has tended to
focus on “what are purported to be general processes” like motivation and cognition and has
largely neglected “the normal flow of life, that is, what people actually do” (Rozin, 2006, p.
365). Thus, social psychology textbooks often include sections on subjects like attitudes,
persuasion, and aggression but often neglect subjects like art, music, drama, literature, eating,
sex, war, and religion (p. 366).
Rozin (2006) notes that this neglect is partially due to the tendency of psychologists to
organize research around broad domains of mental processes, a tradition inherited from British
empirical philosophy. But it is certainly also due to the methodological restrictions placed on
social psychology by its commitment to “the experiment as the primary research method” of the
field (Stam et al., 2000, p. 365). As Danziger (1985) notes, “methodological rules” enable certain
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types of research (e.g., experimentation), but they also limit the types of phenomena available for
research: “such rules mean that only certain kinds of observation will ever be made” (p. 1).
Thus, restricting social psychological research to controlled laboratory experiments
means that only certain types of phenomena will ever be studied by social psychologists because
only certain phenomena are amenable to that mode of research. As Danziger (2000) describes,
historically, this has meant that social psychologists have tended to study phenomena that are
“local, proximal, short-term, and decomposable” (p. 334) because these are the only types of
phenomena that lend themselves to short-term, laboratory experiments.
In contrast, as Gergen et al. (2015) describe, opening the field to greater methodological
diversity simultaneously opens it to a broader range of phenomena: “as we enrich the range of
research practices” accepted by psychologists “we simultaneously expand the arena of
theoretical ideas and their associated values” (p. 6). Such an expansion might be particularly
important given the persistent critique that the social psychology’s emphasis on experimentation
has forced social psychologists to focus almost exclusively on processes contained within
individuals. 5 Indeed, as these scholars note, most of the phenomena studied by modern social
psychologists are only marginally social because these are most easily isolated and manipulated
in the laboratory (see, Danziger, 1992; Danziger, 2000; Gantt & Williams, 2002; Stam, 2006). In
contrast, as Wilhelm Wundt (1900) has argued, qualitative modes of inquiry would enable
psychologists to study truly social, trans-personal phenomena like religion, mythology, and
customs.

Indeed, Gordon Allport’s (1985) famous definition of social psychology is explicitly individualistic: he defines the
discipline as “an attempt to understand and explain how the thought, feeling and behavior of individuals [emphasis
added] are influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied presence of other human beings” (p. 5).
5
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An example of this type of research can be seen in recent work on the relationship
between socio-physical context and aggressive behavior in an urban nightlife setting
(Kalinauskaité et al., 2018). As Kalinauskaité et al. note, historically, social psychologists have
mainly studied aggression in controlled laboratory settings, conceptualizing the environment
wherein aggression occurs as a “conglomeration of isolated stimuli and events” rather than a
holistic “ecological backdrop against which aggression is to be understood” (p. 223). Through
their work, Kalinauskaité et al. show how aggression in natural settings is affected by what they
call atmosphere—“a dynamic and mood-like, but extra-individual state of the socio-physical
setting” (p. 223).
This study is illustrative because it shows how methods correlate with findings. In this
case, researchers were able to discover and describe a truly social (i.e., communal, transpersonal) phenomena because their methods facilitated such. By asking researchers and
participants to recount their shared experiences, Kalinauskaité et al. (2018) were able to
triangulate on something (i.e., atmosphere) that was experienced by all but would have been
impossible to isolate in a laboratory experiment. Thus, incorporating more methodological
diversity into social psychology, including qualitative methods, would allow psychologists to
study truly social phenomena.
If the above analysis is correct, then social psychology would be well served to embrace
qualitative approaches to research. Doing so would bring the field more in line with the more
established sciences, facilitate greater external validity, and open the doors for research on a
wider range of phenomena. Clearly, part of embracing qualitative research will be fostering and
encouraging qualitative researchers and qualitative studies. However, social psychologists should
not just be interested in the quantity of qualitative work; they should also care about increasing
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its quality. And improving the quality of qualitative research would mean not just encouraging
researchers but encouraging methodological work to help researchers better understand the
nature of qualitative inquiry, how it works, and how to do it well.
My purpose in this dissertation will be to perform this work—to help psychologists,
especially social psychologists, to better understand the nature of qualitative research, how to do
it, and what matters in the research process. And while my discussion in the following sections
will refer to qualitative research in general, as a social psychologist, I am primarily interested in
these arguments in the context of improving qualitative work in social psychology.
Qualitative Research and Codified Methods
One area where further methodological work needs to be done is in the relationship
between qualitative research and codified research methods. Curiously, as qualitative research
moves into the mainstream of psychological research, much of the discourse surrounding these
approaches has revolved around the procedural dimensions of qualitative inquiry. That is,
psychologists seem to have conceived of qualitative work as a mode of inquiry to be approached
via “explicit, generalizable formulae, procedures, or rules” (Dunne & Pendlebury, 2002, p. 197),
and most of the methodological work has focused on developing, describing, and defending
various codified approaches to research. Indeed, some scholars, noticing the “superordinate
position” codified methods have played in qualitative inquiry, have declared that psychologists
seem to think of method as “the founding ground of qualitative inquiry” (Tanggaard, 2013, pp.
409, 411; see also Brinkmann, 2015).
This procedural approach to qualitative work is a relatively new phenomenon, however.
Psychologists have not always approached qualitative research in this way. Indeed, while
qualitative research has been omnipresent throughout the history of psychology, it has not always

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

12

been associated with explicit and systematic methods. For example, while founding fathers like
Wilhelm Wundt (e.g., 1900), Sigmund Freud (e.g., 1899/2010), William James (e.g.,
1902/1982), and Abraham Maslow (e.g., 1971) engaged in qualitative forms of inquiry, none of
them spent much time outlining explicit rules or procedures by which they gathered and analyzed
data.
As Wertz et al. (2011) describe, early qualitative researchers tended to be intuitive and
flexible rather than methodological: they collected and analyzed data “unconstrained by any
how-to manual or clear-cut procedural steps” (p. 18), adopting and discarding methods based on
their “fit” with the phenomena they were investigating rather than by referring to procedural
recipes. In fact, to the extent that these scholars discussed their methods at all, it was usually
retrospectively—describing what they wound up doing rather than laying out the rules or steps
that guided their research. This mode of practice was the norm for qualitative research in
psychology well into the 1960s: “qualitative research was practiced and even developed, but the
vast majority of researchers who continued to use these methods did so without accounting
systematically for [their] procedures or asserting their scientific value” (p. 8).
It was not until the 1970s and 1980s that scholars shifted away from this approach and
began conceptualizing qualitative research in terms of discrete procedures for collecting and
analyzing data. During this period, qualitative scholars began releasing methodological works
which attempted to systematize and codify the research practices employed by past researchers
(Wertz, 2014; Wertz et al., 2011). Unlike previous qualitative work, though, these new
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“qualitative traditions” (Wertz et al., 2011, p. 69) focused on standardized, repeatable procedures
rather than flexibility and intuition.6
Qualitative psychology is currently dominated by these qualitative traditions and their
procedural approaches to qualitative research; the older paradigm, where researchers crafted
unique approaches for specific projects, is hardly remembered. Instead, new researchers are
taught to think of qualitative work as structurally the same as statistical modes of analysis: they
are instructed to decide on their research question, select an analytic procedure that will allow
them to answer that question, and then follow the concrete steps of that procedure to complete
their analysis.
And while it is true that some scholars present their methods as flexible heuristics rather
than hard and fast rules, even scholars who emphasize flexibility often present qualitative
research in meticulously defined steps. For example, after explaining that Content Analysis is “a
flexible method for analyzing text data,” Hsieh and Shannon (2005) outline three approaches to
the method in minute detail, describing how researchers should highlight their data, how many
clusters of codes researchers should produce (ideally between 10 and 15), and how they should
display their categories and subcategories (ideally with a tree diagram). A similar level of
granularity can be found in descriptions of Template Analysis (Brooks et al., 2015), Generic
Qualitative Research (Percy et al., 2015), and, counterintuitively, in descriptions of a method
called Intuitive Inquiry (Anderson, 2004).

Halling et al.’s (1994) dialogal phenomenology is an interesting exception to these trends. Their method
emphasizes an approach to data analysis characterized by collaboration and open and ongoing conversation, rather
than “by following predefined procedures or steps” (p. 111; see also, Beck et al., 2003).

6
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This way of teaching and presenting qualitative research is ubiquitous in both textbooks
(e.g., Camic et al., 2003; Creswell & Poth, 2016; Lyons & Coyle, 2016; Wertz et al., 2011;
Willig, 2013) and handbooks of qualitative research (e.g., Denzin & Lincoln, 2017; Richardson,
1996; Willig & Rogers, 2017). It is also common in qualitative professional development
seminars, which offer workshops to teach “practical steps” that will enable researchers to
complete projects using the various established methodologies (see, Research Talk Inc., n.d.). 7
Also, while most qualitative research textbooks, handbooks, and workshops focus on
teaching a small subset of qualitative methods, recent years have seen an explosion of new
approaches to qualitative research, each with its own research philosophy and set of procedures.
For example, in their review, Madill and Gough (2008) identified 32 distinct qualitative research
methodologies, including Grounded Theory, Discourse Analysis, and Narrative Inquiry, but also
Conversation Analysis, Metaphorical Analysis, Repertory Grid Analysis, Process Evaluation,
and Q-Methodology. As Madill and Gough note, this list is not exhaustive.
Given the emphasis on approaching qualitative research via these codified methods, it is
perhaps unsurprising that most modern qualitative research is performed using one of these “offthe-shelf approaches” (Larkin, 2015, p. 254). Carrera-Fernández et al. (2014) have recently
confirmed that this is the case. Of the 6,283 studies they identified in psychological journals,
almost all were performed using a codified approach: 1,827 were performed using Content
Analysis, 743 used Grounded Theory, 668 used Discourse Analysis, 404 used Action Research
methods, 308 used ethnographic methods, 306 used Task Analysis, and 304 used

Some of the organizations responsible for putting on these trainings have even developed their own proprietary
qualitative research methods which are taught exclusively at their seminars or by their consultants (see, Odom
Institute for Research in Social Science, n.d.).
7
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phenomenological methods like Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). Furthermore, in
a survey of United Kingdom dissertation chairs, Thompson et al. (2011) found that half of the
dissertations using qualitative methods were carried out via IPA.
Questioning Codified Methods
Recently, some scholars have argued that this procedural approach to qualitative research
is wrongheaded—that it encourages a mechanical, unreflective mode of practice and leads to
shallow, superficial, and formulaic research (see, e.g., Brinkmann, 2012; 2015; Chamberlain,
2000; 2012; Cheek, 2008; Janesick, 1994; Kvale, 1996; Tanggaard, 2013; van Manen, 2016).
Others have argued from a different direction, suggesting that the modern procedural approach is
based on a misunderstanding of what it is to do qualitative research. These critics suggest that,
given the type of reasoning required to analyze qualitative data, qualitative research cannot be a
methodologically controlled activity as methodologists seem to suggest. Brinkmann (2015), for
example, has argued not only that rigid methods produce bad outcomes, but they do so because
qualitative research depends on “emergent and imaginative” processes that “simply cannot be
rendered predictable” or captured in “rules and procedures that can be made completely explicit
and transparent” (pp. 167-168). In a similar vein, Kvale (1996) has argued that, as in artistic
endeavors, qualitative research (in this case, interview research) “cannot [emphasis added] … be
produced by merely following methodological rules” (p. 106).
As qualitative approaches to research become mainstream in psychology, there is a
growing need to clarify these issues. Indeed, if the type of reasoning at work in qualitative
research is emergent, unpredictable, and informulable in the way these scholars suggest, this
would be highly consequential for qualitative psychology. It would require psychologists to
rethink their approach to qualitative research or at least how they conceived of the methods they
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use. But before this could happen, more work needs to be done to (a) show which aspects of
qualitative work resist being reduced to rules and procedures, (b) demonstrate what this
informulability consists of, and (c) establish what this implies about the practice of qualitative
work.
Fortunately, much of this work has already been done; scholars of hermeneutics—the
philosophical study of understanding and interpretation—have long argued that the human
sciences require a type of reasoning that cannot be reduced to rules and clear-cut procedures.
Indeed, a significant portion of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s (1960/2004) magnum opus, Truth and
Method, is dedicated to an extended critique of what he calls “the methodologism of the human
sciences” (p. 493). The tenor of this critique is that the processes of understanding and
interpretation central to studying human phenomena (e.g., texts, artifacts, actions) “[resist] any
attempt to reinterpret [them] in terms of scientific method” (p. xx). In other words, Gadamer
argues that the ability to understand texts and offer interpretations is not one that can be reduced
to sets of rules or procedures that can be made completely clear and transparent. In Truth and
Method, Gadamer describes what this implies for disciplines like history and philology, but
scholars have since sketched out how his ideas apply to practices in other fields (e.g., education;
see, Nixon, 2017). However, thus far, no one has shown how his critique of methodologism
applies to methodological practices in psychology.
This is not to say that psychologists have neglected Gadamer’s significance for the
discipline. On the contrary, philosophically minded psychologists have long noted the relevance
of hermeneutic philosophy for psychological research and practice (see, e.g., Martin &
Sugarman, 2001; Messer et al., 1988; Packer, 1985; Packer, 2017; Packer & Addison, 1989;
Polkinghorne, 2000; Yanchar, 2015), and many qualitative research textbooks include at least a
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cursory discussion of hermeneutic philosophy (see, e.g., Frost, 2011; Howitt, 2016; Smith, 2015;
Willig, 2013; Willig & Rogers, 2008). Some psychologists have even discussed Gadamer’s ideas
in the context of qualitative research (see, Barak, 2020; Debesay et al., 2008; Hekman, 1984;
Manton, 2019; Moules et al., 2015; Shelley, 2000). None of these authors, however, have shown
in detail how Gadamer’s critique of methodologism applies to research practices in qualitative
psychology. When scholars have mentioned Gadamer’s critique of methods, it has primarily
been in passing, or their analysis has focused on sketching out the implications of his ideas rather
than unpacking his argument and showing how it applies to research practices (e.g., Martin &
Sugarman, 2001; Moules et al., 2015; Polkinghorne, 2000;).
The purpose of this dissertation will be to perform this work by working through
Gadamer’s ideas about methodology and showing how it applies to qualitative research practices
in psychology. Drawing from Gadamer’s phenomenological ontology of understanding and
interpretation and grounded in a close examination of what occurs in the process of qualitative
research, I will attempt to (1) show how the processes at the heart of qualitative research (i.e.,
understanding and interpretation) cannot be successfully directed or controlled by rules and
procedures spelled out in advance of inquiry, and (2) sketch out what this implies for the practice
of qualitative research and the training of researchers.
The argument I will be making, following Gadamer, is that qualitative research—all
qualitative research—is always hermeneutic in the way that Gadamer describes (i.e., it involves
understanding and interpretation and cannot be reduced to rules and procedures), yet, for a
variety of reasons, psychologists have failed to recognize this, they have failed to recognize what
this implies about qualitative methods, or they have been unclear about the functions of their
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methods. This seems to be the case even among psychologists who acknowledge the hermeneutic
nature of qualitative research.
The second point I will make is that psychologists’ lack of clarity regarding the
hermeneutic nature of qualitative research has led scholars to misunderstand what codified
methods can and cannot do for qualitative work. In some cases, this has manifested in
approaches to research that assert that methods can guide practice in ways they cannot. In other
cases, it shows up in vague and confusing discourse around the purposes of research methods.
Finally, I will argue that the mismatch between the nature of qualitative research and the
“methodological self-consciousness” (Gadamer, 1960/2004, p. xxii) of researchers has had
consequences for qualitative psychology—it has misdirected researchers’ attention, guiding them
away from the things that really matter in qualitative research and misleading them about the
nature of qualitative practice. However, I will show that properly understanding the hermeneutic
nature of qualitative work can help scholars see the types of principles and practices that really
can make a difference for qualitative researchers.
Before getting to those arguments, however, it will be necessary to start by mapping out
the different ways qualitative methodologists seem to conceive of research methods. As Moules
et al. (2015) have noted, when discussing how research methods relate to qualitative inquiry, “it
all comes down to what is meant by the term method” (p. 55). Once I have clarified the roles
methods are supposed to be playing in the research process, I will then examine whether methods
can actually perform these functions, given the inescapably hermeneutic nature of qualitative
research.
Method
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Gadamer’s (1960/2004) critique of the human sciences revolves around what he (rather
indiscriminately) describes as “the problem of method” (p. 3). However, despite the centrality of
the concept of method to his book, as Weinsheimer (1985) notes, “Gadamer does not begin by
defining method, enumerating its presuppositions, or elaborating its implications” (p. 1).
Consequently, it is easy to misread what Gadamer is attempting to accomplish in Truth and
Method. Indeed, the term method is polysemous, and obviously, Gadamer’s critique is not
directed toward every sense of the term. 8 In fact, Gadamer (1960/2004) even describes his work
as following a particular method (“it is true that my book is phenomenological in its method,” p.
xxxiii). Thus, clearly, Gadamer’s critique is not directed towards the concept of method per se
but rather at particular theories of method—what I will call models of method.
Models of method are conceptualizations of the nature of methods: what methods are,
how they function, what role they are meant to play in research, and what benefits they are
supposed to offer researchers. As described above, Gadamer’s work shows how certain models
of method are inapplicable to hermeneutic tasks like qualitative research. But before getting to
this, it will be helpful to indicate which models of method are at work in modern qualitative
psychology so I can then show which of these models Gadamer finds objectionable.
Three Models of Method
Psychologists tend to be vague about the nature of methods and the roles they are
supposed to play in research. Indeed, qualitative methodologists primarily focus on describing
and defending their various methods, but they spend comparably little time explaining the role

As Buchler (1961) notes, it makes sense to talk about “mathematical methods, choreographic methods, mining
methods, methods of playing second base, military methods, manufacturing methods” (p. 55) but clearly the term
method is being used differently in all these cases.
8
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their methods are meant to play in research practice. Thus, typically the models of method that
inspire methodological work are implicit and mostly only appear in the context of other
methodological discussions. For example, Giorgi’s views on method—that qualitative research
must proceed via clearly defined methods, that good methods function as rules that direct
researchers’ consciousness as they analyze data—appear most explicitly in his critiques of other
researchers’ methods (see, Giorgi, 2006; 2010; 2011). In other cases, models of method can only
indirectly be inferred, typically by reading through introductions to methods texts where authors
describe the benefits their methods are supposed to bring to the research process (see examples
below).
Nevertheless, if one reviews the methodological literature, it is possible to identify three
distinct models that seem to be animating psychologists’ discussion of methods. Importantly,
these models typically reflect how qualitative methodologists think about their own methods; for
the most part, models of method are not prescriptive. That is, most models of method
acknowledge that there are multiple types of methods, and not all methods need to adhere to the
same standards. Nevertheless, scholars who hold to the models below assert (at least implicitly)
that at least their methods function in the ways these models describe.
Method as Effective Procedures, Recipes, or Maps
The first and most common way psychologists conceptualize their methods is as clear,
specific, and repeatable procedures that reliably lead researchers to successful research. This is
the sense of method that seems to be at work among scholars who describe their methods as stepby-step guides (Smith, 2015, p. 1) or “set[s] of steps that can be followed” (Lyons & Coyle,
2016, p. 27).
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The strongest version of this model is captured by the metaphor of a recipe (see e.g.,
Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003, p. 20). There are two features of recipes that are central to the
metaphor. First, a recipe implies a specific end known in advance. A recipe is always a recipe to
make something specific—a cake, say, or a pot-roast. Second, a recipe provides clear and distinct
directions for how to produce the end product. Significantly, these features are linked: it is
because the final product is already known that the recipe can provide such specific guidance
regarding how to make it. And while it is true that recipes are often vague in their directions—
they instruct the baker to mix the ingredients, but they do not specify for how long or using
which implement—this imprecision is mainly due to convention. With a proper recipe, because
the end result is so clearly understood, directions can be almost infinitely specific. If the author
of a recipe desires, she can tell the prospective baker precisely what to do: which brands of
ingredients to buy, which implements to use, or even how to stand and hold the bowl when
mixing.
This is the model of method applicable to many types of statistical analyses. As with
baking, methods in statistics direct researchers on how to produce known products (e.g., a
regression or a latent factor analysis), and because statisticians already know about these
products—they know what questions they answer and how they are calculated from raw data—
statistical methods can be highly specific.
The main benefit of methods, according to this model is control. Whereas it might be
possible to bake a cake without a recipe or to identify the mean of a data set without using a
method (e.g., by “eyeballing it”), doing so leaves much to chance. The purpose of method,
according to this view, is to overcome chance, and it accomplishes this by laying out a clear path
that researchers can follow to reach their goals. Thus, this model aligns with Melanchthon’s

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

22

(quoted in Ong, 1958) description: method “finds and opens a way through impenetrable and
overgrown places, through the confusion of things, and pulls out and arranges in order the things
pertaining to the matter proposed” (p. 237). Therefore, according to this model, when the proper
method is employed results are nearly guaranteed, almost without regard to the character or
experience level of the actor.
Most descriptions of qualitative methods draw upon this model to varying degrees.
Auerbach and Silverstein (2003), for example, describe their methods as recipes (see, e.g., p. 20)
and assert that, while it can be challenging to discover patterns in a qualitative data set, “by using
our coding method you will [emphasis added] be able to discover patterns that you cannot see
directly” in the data (pp. 31-32). As Auerbach and Silverstein see it, their method functions as a
recipe: it describes a specific end product (i.e., a grounded theory analysis) and lays out concrete
steps to produce that product. And because they believe they have laid out their steps so clearly
and specifically, they describe their method as enabling the researcher to overcome their natural
limitations as it relates to qualitative analysis (see, pp. 31-32).
Others are less comfortable with the level of control implied by the method-as-recipe
metaphor or the implication that qualitative research could be reduced to a mechanical following
of steps (e.g., Larkin, 2015; Willig, 2013). Many of these authors use cartographic metaphors
instead, for example, methods as “maps” (Larkin, 2015, p. 255), “road maps,” “routes” (Lyons &
Coyle, 2016, pp. 27-28), or “path[s] of inquiry” (Applebaum, 2011, p. 6). The method-as-map
metaphor might imply a less constricted mode of analysis; however, the underlying idea is the
same. The metaphor implies that methods can provide clear-cut, step-by-step directions for
producing research, and those directions bring predictability and control to the research process.
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And as with the methods-as-recipes metaphor, describing methods as maps or routes
presupposes knowledge of ends; maps are only helpful if one already knows where one wants to
go, and maps can only be produced by people who know a place. Thus, as with recipes, it is
because scholars have knowledge of ends—they have traveled the path of research and arrived
successfully—that they can produce methods that provide “a clear sense of where to begin and
how to move an analysis forward” (Lyons & Coyle, 2016, p. 27).
Importantly, scholars who hold to the methods-as-maps (or recipes) model do not
necessarily maintain that methods are essential for qualitative research. Parker (2004), for
example, describes his text as setting out concrete “steps towards creative and imaginative
qualitative research” but acknowledges these steps can be “kick[ed] away” (preface) once the
researcher has more experience and confidence. Lyons and Coyle (2016) likewise describe their
methods as “useful initial routes for novice researchers” that can eventually be adapted or
transcended (p. 28). For these scholars, it is possible, in principle, to do qualitative research
without set methods, just as it is possible for experienced chefs to make a familiar dish without a
recipe. However, given the efficacy of tried-and-true methods, these authors often recommend
them to inexperienced researchers.
the Cartesian Model: Method as Rules for Directing Consciousness
The second way psychologists think of methods in qualitative research is as rules and
procedures to guide researchers towards correct conclusions or objective findings. This model of
method shares much with the first theory: it holds that methods are sets of concrete rules and
procedures that can reliably guide researchers in their work. Unlike the first model, though,
scholars in this camp hold that the primary function of methods is to enable researchers to
overcome bias and subjectivity, avoid error, and arrive at certain conclusions. Whereas scholars
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in the first camp assert that what is produced by their methods is “only one of several ‘right
ways’ in which the data can be interpreted” (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003, p. 32), scholars in
this second group maintain that methods, if properly followed, should lead researchers to the
same conclusions.
This model of method has its roots in Descartes’ philosophy; thus, I will refer to it as the
Cartesian model. As Descartes (1985) describes in Rules for the Direction of the Mind, proper
methods imply “reliable rules which are easy to apply, and such that if one follows them exactly,
one will never take what is false to be true or fruitlessly expend one’s mental efforts” (p. 16).
The heart of Descartes' method is finding the proper foundation for investigation, a starting point
that is “perfectly known and incapable of being doubted” (p. 10). Once this starting point is
achieved, the investigator can build step by step from this foundation to conclusions that must
then be indubitably true:
as long as one stops oneself taking anything to be true that is not true and sticks to the
right order so as to deduce one thing from another, there can be nothing so remote that
one cannot eventually reach it, nor so hidden that one cannot discover it. (Descartes,
1637/2006, p. 18)
The guiding metaphor for this model is mathematics (see, Descartes, 1985, p. 17). The
main idea is that methods can structure research so that it can be carried out with the same rigor
and exactitude as mathematics. They do this by helping scholars identify clear and distinct
starting points and then showing them how to work from those starting points to certain
conclusions, much like mathematicians develop complex proofs based on sets of foundational
axioms. While the methods-as-recipes/maps model depends on a clearly defined end known in
advance, this Cartesian approach requires a clear and distinct beginning. Once this beginning is
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obtained, however, Cartesian methods are supposed to show how to build on that foundation and
extend knowledge to new arenas without introducing error.
As with the first model, the main advantage methods are supposed to offer is control;
Cartesian methods are supposed to make research more accessible and predictable. But unlike
the former model, in the Cartesian model, methods are also supposed to make research more
objective and certain. If beginning axioms are known to be true or correct or clear, and if the
steps of the method are followed faithfully, then the foundation’s clarity or truth or correctness
should be evident in the conclusion as well. This model also aims to facilitate intersubjective
agreement; if the starting point is sufficiently clear and the rules for proceeding are clear, then a
skeptical scholar should be able to work through the analysis himself and come to the same
conclusions.
This model is rare in qualitative research. Its primary advocate is Amedeo Giorgi, who
has argued for it in his methodological writings (see, Giorgi, 2009; 2012) and in his critiques of
other methods (see, Giorgi, 2006; 2010; 2011). According to Giorgi (2010), phenomenological
methods (at least those based on Husserl’s phenomenology) provide researchers with a clear and
distinct starting point, and they also provide “rules to guide the conscious processes of the
researcher” (p. 10) to insulate the research process from bias, subjectivity, and error. 9
The key to this clear and distinct starting point is what Giorgi (2011) calls a “purifying
reflective method” (p. 201, quoting Scanlon, 1977, p. xiv). For Giorgi, this purifying reflective
method starts with the researcher adopting the attitude of the phenomenological reduction by (1)

While Giorgi does not invoke Descartes directly in his methodological writings, his theory of method is based on
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, which was heavily influenced by Descartes’ philosophy (see, MacDonald,
2000).

9
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setting aside past experiences, beliefs, or theoretical perspectives and (2) withholding existential
consent and thus viewing the phenomenon experienced precisely as a phenomenon. When
properly accomplished, Giorgi maintains that the adoption of this attitude “means that biases are
eliminated” (Giorgi, 2006, p. 310), and the researcher can view their data clearly and
objectively—that is, they can view the phenomenon precisely as it presents itself in the data.
Then, by following the remaining steps of the method, the researcher is led to produce an
objective description of the essential structure of the experience. Significantly, because the
method began with the researcher adopting the proper attitude and thus finding a clear and
distinct starting point, if the researcher follows the method correctly, Giorgi maintains that the
results of the analysis are an objective, interpretation-free description (see, Giorgi, 2011, p. 212).
Method as Guidelines
Finally, a third group of scholars describes their methods not as concrete procedures or
formal rules but as general guidelines which guide researchers in their research without telling
them specifically what to do. According to this model, methods might consist of general
principles, rules of thumb, examples from past research, advice, suggestions, or cautions, but
none of these function as a decision procedure meant to supplant the researcher’s judgments.
Instead, general principles require judgment for their successful application to the case at hand;
whether and how a principle applies to this data set and this research question is something
decided by the researcher rather than by the method. According to this model, methods are still
meant to help researchers, but they do not help them by telling them what to do. Rather, as
Chamberlain (2012) describes, “methodological ideas and concepts… are there to stimulate, to
be drawn on and utilized, to be adapted in context” (p. 6).
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This is the sense of method at work in Willig’s (2013) textbook. Rather than viewing
qualitative research as the mechanical application of research “recipes,” Willig conceptualizes
the research process “as a form of adventure” and thus something fundamentally creative and
unpredictable (p. 177). Because of this, for Willig, research methods “are best thought of as ways
of approaching a question” rather than formal rules or concrete procedures (p. 177).
Moules et al.’s (2015) description of “hermeneutic or interpretive inquiry” (p. 2) also
holds to this model. In their guidebook, they explicitly argue for an approach to research based
on guidelines rather than “methodological imperatives” (p. 61). Guidelines are different from
methodological imperatives, according to Moules et al., because they do not attempt to tell
researchers “how to respond to an encounter” or how to interpret particular cases (p. 61). Instead,
guidelines “orient the researcher, to help them make responsible, reliable, and defensible
decisions” (p. 61). Furthermore, unlike formal rules, guidelines require attributes like “good
judgment,” experience, skill, or character to be adequately applied (p. 61).
These three models seem to capture the sense of method that animates most
methodological work in qualitative psychology. Significantly, as noted above, these positions are
not often worked out with much rigor or specificity. Consequently, scholars are often vague or
inconsistent in their statements about their methods. For example, in her description of Grounded
Theory, Charmaz (2015) claims that “grounded theory demystifies the conduct of qualitative
inquiry” by outlining specific analytic strategies (p. 54). However, several pages later, she
clarifies that “beyond a few flexible guidelines, grounded theory is indeterminate and openended” (p. 59).
It is also true that scholars might describe their methods as maps or recipes without
subscribing to every implication of those metaphors. The point of the preceding analysis is to
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identify several ideal types of theories about method so that they can be discussed and evaluated.
My intent is not to make claims about the methodological beliefs of specific scholars (except
insofar as those scholars have made their beliefs explicit themselves).
Method and Methodological Self-Consciousness
In the introduction to Truth and Method, Gadamer (1960/2004) describes his philosophy
as an attempt to uncover “what the human sciences truly are, beyond their methodological selfconsciousness” (p. xxii). Gadamer’s point in this statement is that it is possible for there to be a
disconnect between, as Hinman (1980) summarizes, “what the human sciences inevitably are and
what they think they are, between the human sciences and their self-interpretation” (p. 528). In
the present case, this points to the possibility that there might be a disconnect between how
scholars think about and describe their methods and how those methods actually relate to
research practice. This might mean, for example, that scholars might portray their methods as
recipes or maps that guide researchers with specificity, but in practice, their methods only
provide vague guidance and function more like guidelines or general principles.
Such mistakes are not entirely unreasonable. Methods often consist of a mixture of rules,
procedures, and general principles; consequently, it can be challenging to establish whether a
method fits into one model of method or another. For example, Giorgi’s (2009; 2012)
Descriptive Phenomenological Method (DPM) instructs researchers to include every piece of the
dataset in the analysis, and this is obviously a clear and specific rule. Likewise, a method might
direct a researcher to sort their discovered themes alphabetically, and this would count as a
concrete procedure, not a general principle.
However, what is relevant for our purposes is not whether qualitative methods contain
some concrete rules or procedures. Instead, the question is whether rules and procedures relate to
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the central processes of qualitative research or whether they merely direct peripheral elements of
the analysis. In other words, a cooking method that provided specific instructions for arranging
cooking utensils and sorting ingredients but provided no direction for which ingredients to use or
how to combine those ingredients would not be a proper recipe because it left the central tasks of
cooking undirected. Likewise, if a qualitative research method provided concrete directions for
how to sort data (e.g., alphabetically) and display results, but it provided no specific direction
regarding how to identify relevant material in the dataset or how to answer the research question,
then it would not be functioning as a true method-as-recipe. Such a method would be providing
concrete guidance for the superficial elements of the analysis but leaving the central task of the
analysis (i.e., actually answering the research question) undirected.
One way to establish whether specific methods function as recipes, rules, or general
principles would be to work through them line-by-line. Methods that rely on general principles,
guidelines, or suggestions will lack specificity regarding the central elements of the analysis, and
this would be evident in the text of the method. Percy et al.’s (2015) description of Inductive
Analysis is an example of this. After instructing the researcher to read through their data and
highlight passages that appear meaningful, the second step of their method is to “review the
highlighted data and use your research question to decide if the highlighted data are related to
your question” (p. 80).
Finding passages of text that address the investigator’s research question is obviously a
central task of the analysis, yet when it comes to this step of the process, Percy et al.’s (2015)
method fails to give specific advice. What precisely should the researcher highlight in their data
set? How does the researcher know whether highlighted data relate to their research question or
not? On these fronts—which are the central tasks of the analysis—the method has nothing to say.
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Thus, clearly, their method does not direct practice with the specificity of a recipe. At best, the
instruction to “use your research question to decide if the highlighted data are related to your
question” is a general guideline.
Thus, a line-by-line analysis of research methods could clearly help clarify the nature of
these methods and how they relate to practice. However, Gadamer’s philosophy implies that it is
possible to establish in principle which models of method apply to hermeneutic endeavors like
qualitative research. It is possible because, as Gadamer shows, hermeneutic processes like
qualitative research necessarily require understanding and interpretation, and understanding and
interpretation have certain features that make them compatible with certain models of method
and not others.
Understanding and Interpretation
Thus far, I have outlined possible roles for methods in qualitative research: they could
provide clear procedural direction, helping researchers know what to do next; they could guide
researchers’ consciousness as they analyze their data, helping them to avoid error, bias, or
subjectivity; or they could function as general principles that researchers flexibly apply to their
projects. However, as described above, whether and how research methods can guide researchers
in the ways described depends on what type of process qualitative research is, that is, what kind
of reasoning it requires. In this section, I will unpack Gadamer’s ideas on this subject.
I will argue, following Gadamer, that the central tasks of qualitative research are
inescapably hermeneutic—that is, qualitative work is centrally about understanding and
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interpreting texts. 10 I will then sketch out Gadamer’s ideas about the essential nature of
understanding and interpretation, specifically focusing on those dimensions that relate to codified
methods in the senses described in section two. Once this is accomplished, the next section (i.e.,
section four) will bring these domains together, and I will show what Gadamer’s ideas imply
about the possible uses of method in qualitative research.
Qualitative Research as a Hermeneutic Task
Qualitative researchers have not always conceived of their work in hermeneutic terms. As
Willig (2017) points out, “qualitative psychologists have preferred to use the term ‘analysis’ to
describe their activities,” presumably out of a desire to “distance qualitative psychology from an
association with the arts” (p. 274). Nevertheless, given that qualitative research always involves
making sense of human speech or action, it is easy to see why hermeneutic scholars have argued
that “qualitative research ineluctably is hermeneutical” (Rennie, 1999, p. 5; see also, Moules, et
al., 2015; Schwandt, 1999; Willig, 2012). In short, this means that qualitative research always
involves understanding texts—interviews, journals, responses to questionnaires, and so forth—
and it always involves interpretation. 11
To understand, in the hermeneutic sense, is to grasp the meaning, significance, or import
of a text, speech, or action. As Grondin (2021) describes, “to understand (verstehen) is, in
general, to grasp something (‘I get it’), to see things more clearly (say, when an obscure or

10
Qualitative research can also center on other phenomena: non-written speech, behaviors, or artifacts, and the same
hermeneutic structure described below would apply. However, for the sake of simplicity I will focus on qualitative
research centered on written sources.

The descriptions of understanding and interpretation below pertain to the (ontical) experiences of understanding
something and offering an interpretation rather than to the ontological sense of these terms as worked out by
Heidegger (1927/2008) in Being and Time.
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ambiguous passage becomes clear), to be able to integrate a particular meaning into a larger
frame” (p. 44). As Gadamer (1979) summarizes, “those who ‘understand’ a text… acquire
through understanding a new liberty of mind” which involves “numerous and new possibilities,
like interpreting a text, seeing the hidden relations it conceals, drawing conclusions, and so on”
(p. 130). When we understand a text, that is, we see what the author is getting at or comprehend
the experience they are describing; when we fail to understand, texts are murky or confusing, and
we are unable to make sense of them. Significantly, understanding (in the sense relevant here) is
not mere intellectual mastery; it is not the same as grasping that two and two make four. Rather,
it is coming to grasp the intentions, purposes, desires, or meanings of an agent. As Gadamer
(1995) describes, “the art of understanding is certainly above all else the art of listening” (p.
274)—thus, most essentially, understanding is hearing what people are saying to us.
Interpretation is intimately connected to understanding. Interpretation is the act of
making explicit, working out, developing, or refining that which has been understood (see,
Wrathall, 2021, pp. 425-428). In qualitative research, interpretation is most apparent in the
results section, where qualitative researchers describe what they have understood after reviewing
the data they have collected; however, as I will describe below, it also occurs throughout the
process of understanding texts. 12 In Truth and Method, Gadamer (1960/2004) describes
interpretation as similar to highlighting (p. 404). Highlighting a text brings certain passages to
the fore with the purpose of making the purpose or meaning of the text more apparent to future

Making an understanding explicit by expressing it with words is not the only way one can interpret, though.
Reading a text message and acting on its instruction (e.g., by picking up a gallon of milk from the store) would also
be an interpretation in this sense. Doing so is showing that one has understood the message in a certain way and is
“putting that understanding to work” by running the errand. Other modes of making explicit, working out,
developing, or refining would count as interpretation as well, according to this understanding of the term.
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readers. Likewise, a good interpretation “bring[s] to light an underlying coherence or sense”
(Taylor, 1971, p. 3), which makes texts more clear and easier to understand. Willig and Rogers
(2008) describe this as an “amplification of meaning… an exploration and clarification of the
many strands of meaning which constitute the phenomenon of interest” (p. 9). As Gadamer
(1979) describes, the ultimate purpose of offering an interpretation is to “bring [the text] near so
that it speaks in a new… [and] clearer voice” (p. 83).
This analysis has described understanding and interpretation as discrete acts, and for
present purposes, this is mostly adequate. Gadamer (1960/2004) would clarify, though, that
understanding and interpretation are more intimately connected than this analysis might suggest.
Indeed, he maintains that “interpretation is not an occasional, post facto supplement to
understanding; rather, understanding is always interpretation, and hence interpretation is the
explicit form of understanding” (p. 318). One reason for this is that interpretation always implies
a prior understanding. If interpretation is making explicit what has been understood, then
interpretation is, in a sense, always derivative of understanding.
But Gadamer points out that the relationship goes in the opposite direction as well:
understanding always involves interpretation. This means that even in cases that do not call for
an act of interpretation (e.g., writing up one’s understanding), attempting to understand a text
always involves at least making things clearer to oneself—a sort of internal, proto-interpretation.
Understanding, in other words, always involves exploring, clarifying, and amplifying meaning,
at least to oneself. Because of this intimate connection, I will not treat understanding and
interpretation as discrete moments of the analysis in the analysis below. Instead, following
Gadamer, I will refer to them together as interpretive understanding (e.g., p. 279) except where it
makes sense to break them apart.
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Based on these descriptions of understanding, it is clear why scholars assert that
“hermeneutic theory… is central to qualitative inquiry in psychology” (Eatough & Smith, 2008,
p. 192): qualitative research always involves understanding texts—interviews, diaries, responses
to questionaires—and it always involves expressing, clarifying, and amplifying the meaning of
those texts by interpreting them in light of the researchers questions and interests.
This does not mean, however, that all qualitative research aims at the same types of
meaning. Some forms of qualitative research focus on explicit meanings—only those things
directly intended by research participants—while others attempt to understand implicit
dimensions of meaning, for example, by analyzing the functional or constructive dimensions of
expressions (see, Willig, 2015). Additionally, the various methodological traditions in qualitative
research direct researchers to different domains of meaning, say, by pointing them towards lived
experience, narrative meanings, social representations of phenomena, or unconscious desires or
purposes (see, e.g., the methods described in Willig & Rogers, 2017). In each of these cases,
though, the hermeneutic dimension of research is maintained; all of these methods involve
making sense of texts—perhaps with different purposes or from different perspectives—and they
all involve clarifying and amplifying that meaning by offering interpretations.
“Non-Interpretative” Qualitative Research
Some qualitative scholars argue against this position, asserting that their approaches to
research are not hermeneutic and that they avoid understanding and interpretation altogether.
Giorgi (e.g., 1992, 2014), for example, argues that a properly Husserlian approach to research is
not hermeneutic. Through his methodological writings, he argues that if a researcher adopts the
right attitude (described below), that researcher can intuit phenomena directly and then describe
their structure precisely as it shows itself in the data. Importantly, Giorgi asserts that the various
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steps of this method avoid understanding and interpretation entirely: by adopting the proper
attitude, the researcher directly perceives the phenomenon of interest without the mediation of
understanding, 13 and by merely describing the structure of that phenomena precisely as it shows
itself in the data, the researcher avoids any form of interpretation.
Exhaustively responding to this position is outside the scope of this paper (see Rennie,
2012 for a hermeneutic critique), but I will address several elements of Giorgi’s claims in the
following section. At present, it will suffice to point out that Giorgi’s account does not seem to
give enough thought to the difficulties of working with written descriptions of experience. While
it might seem plausible that researchers could have direct, unmediated access to the content of
their own experience, in the way Husserl describes, the idea that one could directly understand
written descriptions of the experiences of others without interpretation appears far-fetched. 14
Take, for example, Beck’s (2013) phenomenological analysis of social anxiety, which he
performed via the DPM (i.e., Giorgi’s method). In their descriptions of social anxiety, Beck’s
participants provide nuanced accounts of social situations and their emotional reactions, and
these descriptions seem to demand the clarifying work of interpretive understanding. For
example, Beck’s data includes detailed descriptions of social anxiety but also descriptions of
uncomfortable sexual tension, self-condemnation, and regret, as well as insightful higher-order
reflections on the causes of social anxiety. And, adding to this complexity, it is often unclear
whether participants are relating what they felt in the moment or how they have made sense of

13
This type of intuiting of the phenomenon could be described as a form of understanding, but the important thing
from Giorgi’s perspective is that it is not understanding in a hermeneutic sense. That is, Giorgi claims that it is a
form of unmediated understanding which bypasses the hermeneutic circle and apprehends phenomena directly.
14
It is also worth noting that scholars debate whether Husserl’s account of un-mediated access to the structures of
one’s own experiences is defensible (see, e.g., Caputo, 1984).
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the experience subsequently (e.g., pp. 214-215, #71). Thus, it seems unrealistic to suppose that
researchers could work with data like this without the working out, unpacking, and clarifying
work of interpretive understanding.
Giorgi (2009) has argued that the DPM avoids the need for interpretation because it
instructs researchers to merely “describe the ambiguity such as it presents itself” rather than
clarify it (p. 127). But this is obviously a relative instruction. Ambiguity exists on a spectrum,
and while it might make sense to instruct researchers to merely reproduce ambiguity in cases
where it is insoluble, there are obviously cases where ambiguous passages can reasonably be
clarified without the need for undo speculation. One need only examine an example of the DPM
such as Beck’s (2013) to see that this is the case. The point is that Giorgi’s injunction that
researchers avoid certain types of speculative interpretation does not purify his method from the
inevitable hermeneutic complexity involved in bringing texts “from unintelligibility to
understanding” (Palmer, 1969, p. 13). It does not obviate the necessity of interpretation.
The Structure of Understanding and Interpretation
If the above analysis is correct—if qualitative research is hermeneutic as I have
described—then what type of processes are understanding and interpretation? As I have shown,
this question is the key to understanding the relationship between qualitative research and
codified methods. Fortunately, this issue is at the heart of modern philosophical hermeneutics,
and hermeneutic philosophers, Gadamer in particular, have addressed it at length.
In his studies of interpretive understanding, Gadamer is heavily influenced by the
philosophy of his teacher and mentor, Martin Heidegger. While early hermeneutic thinkers
tended to focus on practical or normative dimensions of textual interpretation (e.g., how to make
sense of difficult passages, how to interpret correctly), modern hermeneutics, following
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Heidegger, have tended to focus on the meaning of understanding and interpretation in general—
“[their] basic nature, scope and validity, as well as [their] place within and implications for
human existence” (George, 2020, pp. 1-2). Specifically, in his magnum opus Being and Time,
Heidegger (1927/2008) describes understanding not as merely “one kind of cognition among
others,” but rather as a “basic mode of Dasein’s being” (p. 182)—an existentiale, in Heidegger’s
terminology (see, p. 71). Human existence as a whole is hermeneutic, according to Heidegger;
human beings relate to their world understandingly by experiencing things in terms of their
meaning, significance, and possibilities, and they make that understanding explicit by acting in
the world in particular ways.
Gadamer’s hermeneutics builds off this conception of understanding and interpretation.
However, rather than directly continuing Heidegger’s project, Gadamer’s work focuses on
working out the implications of Heidegger’s philosophy for the human sciences (e.g., history and
philology). Gadamer does this by describing the structure of interpretive understanding as
manifested in experiences with phenomena like art or texts. However, while Gadamer
(1960/2004) frequently references fields like history and philology, he is quick to clarify that his
main purpose is philosophical rather than normative or practical; he clarifies that he does not
intend to develop a procedure for understanding texts, nor to direct “the methodical practices of
the human sciences” (p. xxv). Rather, in Truth and Method, he seeks to “clarify the conditions in
which understanding takes place” (p. 306), describe what makes understanding possible (p.
xxvii), or lay out “what always happens” in acts of interpretive understanding (p. 534). As Ibbett
(1987) summarizes, Gadamer seeks “to give a general description of the necessary conditions of
all acts of understanding” and, by doing so, to “show how we achieve an understanding of the
texts we read” (p. 550).
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Following Heidegger, Gadamer’s (1960/2004) approach to these questions is
phenomenological (p. xxxiii), although not in a strict Husserlian sense (see, Dostal, 2021). This
means that Gadamer holds that the way to uncover the essence of interpretive understanding is to
describe the experience of interpretive understanding and then to ascertain what conditions make
it possible—that is, to ascertain “what always happens” when a person understands something
(p. 534). To get at this, Gadamer analyzes experiences of interpretive understanding in fields like
philology, history, law, and theology. He also describes how the structure of interpretive
understanding is manifested in experiences with works of art or interpersonal conversation.
To make Gadamer’s description of interpretive understanding clear, it will help to
proceed by way of an example.My example will focus on an instance of interpersonal,
conversational understanding. As Gadamer (1960/2004) argues, the experience of coming to
understand a partner in a conversation is one of the places where interpretive understanding can
be seen most clearly (see, e.g., p. 385). Thus, using a conversational example (rather than an
example of interpreting a text) will help make some of the structures of interpretive
understanding clearer and more apparent. Following this example, I will describe what this
experience of interpersonal understanding reveals about interpretive understanding in general. I
will then show how this same process applies to understanding and interpreting texts.
Tim and Brian have met up to talk about Tim’s relationship with his wife. When they get
together, Tim begins by saying that he feels like he doesn’t know who his wife is
anymore. This description catches Brian off guard; he knew that they were having
trouble, but he thought they merely argued a lot. He doesn’t understand what Tim could
mean by saying that he doesn’t know who his wife is. As the conversation progresses,
Brian listens and asks questions, and he slowly begins to see what Tim is getting at—how
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his wife feels distant from him, almost unreachable; how she feels like a different person
from the woman whom he married; and how it feels like he is living with a stranger
rather than a friend and a partner.
Understanding, Expectation, and Revision
The first thing Gadamer might point out from this example is how, paradoxically,
understanding always starts with understanding. In the above example, Brian wanted to
understand what was going on in Tim’s marriage, but he came to the conversation already having
a vague sense of what was going on. That is, he came to the situation already having an
understanding of his friend’s situation, albeit a sketchy, ill-formed understanding.
This is not just the case with Brian’s approach to Tim, though. As Heidegger (1927/2008)
describes, understanding “is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to
us” (pp. 191-192). Interpretive understanding never begins with a blank slate; rather, we always
come to a conversation (or a text) with “expectations of meaning drawn from our own prior
relation to the subject matter” (Gadamer, 1960/2004). Gadamer describes this preliminary
understanding as a fore-conception (p. 280), a fore-meaning (p. 282), or, more colloquially, as a
“rough draft” of meaning (Gadamer, 1979, p. 149). As Weinsheimer (1985) summarizes, this
fore-conception is “what [the] interpreter understands already—that is, before beginning” (p.
166).
Next, Gadamer might point out how a fore-conception always projects out certain
expectations regarding what the text will say (i.e., what it means). For this reason, Gadamer
describes fore-conception as always entailing fore-projection. Brian thought Tim’s marriage
troubles consisted of constant bickering, and that fore-conception projected certain expectations
about what Tim might say to him in their conversation. Unfortunately for Brian, his fore-
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conception was only partially correct: he was correct that they were having trouble, but incorrect
that it was primarily about fighting. Because of this, as Tim begins to describe his marriage,
Brian initially has a hard time following what he is saying (how could Tim not know his own
wife?).
Gadamer (1960/2004) describes this as “being pulled up short by the text” (p. 280). When
this happens, either the text “does not yield any meaning at all or its meaning is not compatible
with what we had expected” (p. 280). Pulled up short in this way, the interpreter necessarily
revises his fore-conception and posits a new potential meaning of the text and procedes on the
basis of this new fore-conception. Brian, for example, might try out another familiar possibility:
maybe Tim is just saying that he and his wife struggle to communicate. This fore-conception
then projects out new expectations regarding the meaning of the text, expectations which are
either met by the text or challenged again, calling for another revision. Thus, understanding the
meaning of a text “is nothing other than elaborating [i.e., working out] a preliminary project [i.e.,
a preliminary anticipation of meaning] which will be progressively corrected in the course of the
interpretative reading” (Gadamer, 1979, p. 149).
Understanding is complete, for the most part, once an interpreter’s fore-conception of a
text is largely adequate to the text itself, and the interpreter is able to make sense of the text as a
whole. 15 Thus, Gadamer (1960/2004) describes correct understanding in terms of harmony: “the
harmony of all the details with the whole” (p. 302). (And vice versa, “the failure to achieve this

Gadamer (1960/2004) asserts this process is at work whenever we understand anything. But clearly, it exists in
varying degrees. “Hermeneutic work is based on a polarity of familiarity and strangeness” (p. 306), he notes, and
consequently, when one is confronted by a relatively familiar expression—a friend waving hello, for instance—
one’s fore-conceptions and fore-projections might be entirely adequate, and the situation might be more-or-less
instantly understood.
15
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harmony means that understanding has failed” p. 302.) Once Brian’s understanding of Tim’s
situation is adequate, Brian can make sense of all the pieces of Tim’s description: the metaphors
he uses to describe his marriage, his descriptions of his feelings towards his wife, and so forth.
He understands what Tim means when he says he doesn’t know who his wife is anymore.
Prejudices as Conditions of Understanding
Gadamer’s analysis, and the example of Brian and Tim, shows that we always approach
texts or conversations with a host of pre-existing questions, beliefs, and expectations and that
understanding occurs as we allow these to be revised by our encounter with the text. Put
together, Gadamer (1960/2004) refers to these pre-existing elements as prejudices. Gadamer
describes them as prejudices because they are, in essence, preliminary judgments of the meaning
of the text—that is, they are judgments that are “rendered before all the elements that determine
a situation [or the meaning of the text] have been finally examined” (p. 283).
Gadamer (1960/2004) acknowledges that in modern times the term prejudice has
negative connotations and is often equated with an “unfound judgment” or even an outright
“false judgment” (p. 283). However, his point is that understanding always presupposes this
background of beliefs, questions, and expectations; he asserts that “all understanding inevitably
involves some prejudice” (p. 283). But Gadamer does not hold that prejudices are merely
regrettable constraints on understanding. Rather he maintains that prejudices are “conditions of
understanding” (p. 289). And while erroneous prejudices that are stubbornly maintained can be
barriers to understanding, Gadamer wants to show how the right prejudices (or relating to
prejudices in the right way) can be fruitful for understanding.
Tim and Brian’s example shows this. Obviously, and as was shown, Brian entered the
conversation with his friend possessed of certain beliefs and expectations about his friend’s
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situation. And it is clear how these prejudices could obstruct Brian’s understanding; if Brian
stubbornly held onto his belief that Tim’s problems must be about fighting, then Brian would
have failed to understand his friend’s situation. Gadamer (1979) describes this as “falling under
the suggestion of [one’s] own rough drafts” (p. 149).
However, it is equally easy to see how Brian’s pre-existing knowledge enabled his
understanding. Ultimately, Brian is able to understand what Tim is saying because he has a
certain amount of background knowledge and thus certain prejudices. Brian knows what
marriages are and has a sense of what it means for marriages to deteriorate, for example. In fact,
the only way Brian would be able to entirely shed his prejudices would be to forget everything
he knows about marriage, relationship problems, and his friend’s biography. But clearly, this
type of amnesia would not make it easier for Brian to understand; in fact, it would make his
friend’s statements incomprehensible (“what do you mean ‘wife’?”). As Fehér (2016)
summarizes, “such a suspension would amount to something like a total brainwashing, a point of
no return to a conscious and reasonable mental state or judgment” (p. 285). Prejudices are thus
essential elements of successful understanding.
The Hermeneutic Circle
These observations on the process of understanding and the role of prejudices in
understanding are manifestations of what hermeneutic philosophers describe as the hermeneutic
circle. The idea that circularity is involved in interpretation goes back to antiquity, and the
hermeneutic thinkers have used the terms in different ways over the years (see, Grondin, 2016).
In his writings, Gadamer uses the idea in at least two ways.
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First, Gadamer (1960/2004) uses the hermeneutic circle as a shorthand to describe the
process of coming to understand something (see, e.g., pp. 279-280). Thus, the hermeneutic circle
can be thought of as how understanding occurs. Grondin (2016) summarizes this well:
The process of understanding, [Gadamer] argues, is a constant back and forth between
the whole and the parts: one’s interpretation of the parts of a text cannot but be guided by
a (pre-)understanding of the whole in which they stand, yet this understanding of the
whole is constantly revised the more one advances in the understanding of the parts,
which are then understood in light of a more accurate idea of the whole. (p. 304)
This process clearly describes the process of trial and error (projection and revision) that
showed up in Brian’s conversation with Tim. Importantly, Gadamer (1960/2004) is quick to note
that this description is not meant as a methodological prescription but as a description of what
understanding fundamentally is: “the circle of understanding is not a ‘methodological’ circle, but
describes an element of the ontological structure of understanding” (p. 305)
The second way Gadamer refers to the hermeneutic circle is in reference to the logical
structure of interpretive understanding. In this, Gadamer (1960/2004) reiterates the ideas of
Heidegger (see, p. 279). The main idea is that, structurally, understanding always occurs on the
basis of presuppositions, assumptions, or, in Gadamer’s words, prejudices. As with Brian’s
approach to his conversation with Tim, interpreters always already understand something of what
they are trying to understand; they never approach texts or conversations as an entirely blank
slate.
Tradition and Language
If interpretive understanding always proceeds on the basis of fore-conceptions and
prejudices, then where do these come from? Clearly, Brian’s pre-judgments of his friend’s
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situation came partially from personal experience: they came from his personal history, his
relationship with his parents, his relationship with his wife, and his knowledge of Tim’s
marriage. But Gadamer points out that prejudices also come through the medium of culture.
Brian’s context for understanding Tim’s marriage troubles, in other words, has been shaped
ahead of time by the culture Brian lives in. His culture has provided him with a basic
understanding of the nature of marriage, of how marriages can deteriorate, of how husbands and
wives relate to each other, and so forth. And these understandings prejudice Brian as he goes into
his conversation, influencing him to expect certain meanings and not others.
Gadamer typically discusses this in terms of tradition rather than culture. Interpretive
understanding is always guided in advance by prejudices that arise from the traditions
interpreters find themselves in. As Gadamer (1979) summarizes, “understanding always implies
a pre-understanding which is in turn pre-figured by the determinate tradition in which the
interpreter lives and which shapes his prejudices” (p. 108). In other words, interpretive
understanding always takes place within a tradition, and tradition provides the inescapable
foundation from which interpreters approach that which they seek to understand. This is not
optional, according to Gadamer (1960/2004): “one of the conditions of understanding in the
human sciences is belonging to tradition” (p. 338). Tradition, Gadamer maintains, is one of the
conditions that make interpretive understanding possible.
As in his discussion of prejudice, Gadamer is at pains to show that tradition is not a
hindrance to understanding, as some Enlightenment thinkers supposed, nor is it merely a
limitation to be tolerated. Instead, Gadamer maintains that tradition opens things up for
understanding—that it can provide fruitful starting points for understanding. Indeed, as we saw,
the tradition Brian came from shaped the prejudices by which he approached Tim’s account.
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While some of those prejudices were erroneous and needed to be revised, Brian’s cultural (i.e.,
traditional) understanding of marriage and relationships also facilitated his understanding of
Tim’s situation. Were Brian coming from a Martian culture, which has no conception of
marriage (Martians reproduce asexually), it would have been significantly more difficult for him
to understand Tim’s situation.
Gadamer would also point out the role that language plays in Brian’s understanding of
Tim. First, and most obviously, language provides the medium through which Tim
communicates his situation to Brian. Second, and less obviously, Brian’s understanding of Tim is
also linguistic. As Gadamer (1960/2004) describes, “understanding of the subject matter must
take the form of language” (p. 386). This means that Brian’s ability to understand his friend is
intimately connected with his ability to put Tim’s message into his own words—even if only
implicitly. As Dunne (1993) summarizes, “to understand something is to make it one’s own…
and there is no other way of making it one’s own except by finding a home for it in the language
in which one lives” (p. 142). Thus, when Brian really understands his friend, he can see the
meaning of Tim’s words. He can see how they make sense and how they fit the situation Tim is
describing, and he can even find his own words to describe his friend’s situation.
Application: Understanding for Oneself
Finally, Gadamer would note how Brian’s attempt to understand is structured by the
purposes with which Brian approaches his conversation with his friend. In a basic sense, this
means that Brian typically has some sort of question that is guiding him in his conversation with
Tim, maybe, “what is going on with my friend’s marriage?” Understanding his friend, thus,
would mean being able to apply what he is saying to the question Brian has, and understanding
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would be incomplete unless Brian can see how he can relate Tim’s speech to his animating
questions.
Gadamer (1960/2004) describes this as application and maintains that it is an essential
element of interpretive understanding: “understanding always involves something like applying
the text to be understood to the interpreter’s present situation” (pp. 318-319). Understanding,
interpretation, and application are thus “one unified process,” according to Gadamer (p. 319).
Therefore, when a judge understands a law, she does not merely understand it is a relic of the
intentions of past legislators; she understands how it applies to modern life, to herself, and to the
case she is adjudicating in the present. To understand the law without seeing how it applies to the
present would be not to understand it at all. So too with other forms of understanding.
And while I emphasized above that Brian’s understanding is structured by the question he
brings into the conversation, that question is merely the tip of the iceberg of his purposes in
understanding Tim. Brian also has reasons behind his question; he wants to understand based on
certain interests. He is interested, for example, in being a loving friend and in living out his
religious convictions, and he is interested because he wants to know how marriages work. And
these interests are likewise grounded in his situation: Brian is animated by religious interests
because he senses himself to be a spiritual being in the way his tradition describes, and he wants
to understand how marriages work because he can feel the contingency of his relationship with
his wife. Thus, Brian’s understanding is not complete until he can see how his friend’s
description relates to his questions, interests, and situation. As Dunne (1993) summarizes,
understanding thus always “contains within itself an application of the possibilities of the text to
the interpreter's own position” (p. 105), and it is incomplete until the interpreter can mediate
between the text he is reading and the reasons he has approached that text in the first place.
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Understanding Texts
This analysis has shown (1) that interpretive understanding is a process involving
(pre)understanding, expectation, and revision; (2) that it is always guided by prejudices that are
shaped by tradition; (3) that it always occurs through the medium of language; and (4) that it
always involves applying what is understood to the interpreter's questions, interests, and
situation. Significantly, Gadamer (1960/2004) maintains that this account is not a prescription—
that is, it is not guidance for how to understand texts. Instead, it is “a description of the way
interpretive understanding is achieved” (p. 279)—that is, it is a description of what interpretive
understanding is, of its essence or fundamental nature. In other words, Gadamer maintains that
this structure is at play whenever an interpreter understands a text (or anything else) whether the
interpreter is aware of it or not.
The above analysis was based on an example of understanding a partner in a
conversation, but it is easy to see how this same structure is evident when an interpreter
approaches a text. Indeed, as Gadamer (1960/2004) argues, understanding texts always involves
“a reciprocal relationship of the same kind as conversation [emphasis added]” (p. 385). The main
difference between the two is that while a conversation partner can answer questions directly, a
text is comparably static in this regard. However, while a text cannot modify itself to answer an
interpreter’s questions, understanding a text still requires the hermeneutic circle of
understanding, expectation, and revision that we described above, and it still presupposes the
researcher’s prejudices, the effects of tradition and language, and it still involves application.
And while the above example was conversational—an example of someone coming to
understand the experience of a peer—it is not hard to see how qualitative research involves a
similar type of interpersonal understanding. When researchers, for example, interview teachers
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from former East Germany about their identities (Farouk & Camia, 2022) or collect narratives of
recovery from schizophrenia (Davidson, 2003) or attempt to understand individual’s experiences
of being coached (Gyllensten & Palmer, 2007) it requires the same type of teasing apart,
unpacking, and clarifying that Brian experienced in his conversation with Tim. Once again, some
features are different—collecting and analyzing data is different in a research context than it is in
a conversation—but the underlying structure is the same.
If the preceding analysis is correct, then qualitative research is essentially a hermeneutic
task that is carried out by a mode of reasoning that is distinctively, emergent, contingent, and
unpredictable and never presuppositionless or a-historical. And if this is the case, then it remains
to be seen what role codified methods might play in directing qualitative research practice. It is
to this point that I will now turn.
Hermeneutics and Method
If qualitative research is hermeneutic in the way Gadamer describes, then what does this
imply about the relationship between qualitative inquiry and codified methods? Can research
methods tell researchers how to understand and interpret texts with the specificity of a recipe?
Can they make qualitative research more predictable and controllable? Can research methods
guide the consciousness of researchers so they will be able to understand and interpret texts
objectively and without error? In this section, I will attempt to show how Gadamer’s description
of interpretive understanding, summarized above, answers these questions and clarifies how
methods can relate to qualitative work.
Hermeneutics and the Limitations of Effective Procedures
As described above, one way that psychologists think of research methods is as effective
procedures akin to recipes or maps. The main idea of this model is that methods consist of
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specific and repeatable procedures that provide a clear path for researchers to follow. The main
advantage methods are meant to provide, according to this view, is to make research more
consistent, controllable, and repeatable.
However, as I argued above, if methods are to serve these purposes and offer these
benefits, they would need to provide specific directions for the central tasks of the research
process. That is, they would need to provide specific directions regarding how to work through,
unpack, and clarify the data of the analysis and then communicate what was discovered to others.
They would need to direct the practice of understanding and interpretation, in other words. And
while general guidelines for these tasks might be helpful, methods based on guidelines would not
function as recipes or maps, nor could they offer the predictability and control promised by this
model.
However, as shown above, even methods which describe themselves as recipes or maps
are often frustratingly vague when it comes to the central interpretive elements of the analysis.
As noted, when Percy et al. (2015) get to the main tasks of Inductive Analysis (i.e., figuring out
how the data answers the research question), they are unable to provide specific directions. And
so too with many other qualitative research methods. The analysis of understanding and
interpretation in the previous section, though, suggests why this is not just a failure of some
methods; instead, as Gadamer’s analysis shows, it is an inevitable limitation applicable to any
hermeneutic task.
Thus, the reason recipes and maps can provide such concrete instructions and offer
predictability and control is that they presuppose a high degree of knowledge about the ends of
the processes they direct. It is because chefs already know about a specific food product (i.e.,
what it is, how it should taste, what it is made of) that they are able to provide such specific
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directions; it is because cartographers already know about a location that they can give directions
to get there.
But as shown in the previous section, when it comes to hermeneutic tasks, interpreters
never know the specific end—the specific meaning, the correct interpretation, the answer to their
question—before they begin their analysis. As Nixon (2017) summarizes, “when interpreting a
difficult text, we do not know in advance the full meaning of the text” (p. 43). Hermeneutic tasks
are similar to practical/moral tasks in this regard: in both tasks, “the ends themselves are at stake
and not perfectly fixed beforehand” (Gadamer, 1979, p. 143; I will return to this connection in
the concluding section). What this means in practice is that a method like Thematic Analysis
cannot function as a recipe for how to understand and interpret a specific dataset because the
method has no knowledge of that dataset or what it might say. The method, thus, is attempting to
direct a task where the end results are unknown.
One might object that methodologists do have some knowledge of the ends of qualitative
research. A thematic analysis, for example, is a certain type of analysis associated with certain
types of questions that always has certain features. Consequently, the argument might go, it
would make sense that methodologists should be able to create specific instructions to guide
researchers to make a research product with those features.
However, the assertion that thematic analyses (or whatever method) always have the
same features overlooks the substantive differences between different analyses. A thematic
analysis of attitudes towards violent media and a thematic analysis of family responses to
schizophrenia might superficially look the same—they both might have a similar write-up, use
similar tables, or produce lists of themes and examples. Yet the central feature of each analysis is
not the structure of the report; it is the specific research question, the texts to be analyzed, and
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the meanings identified. And these are the precise areas where the methods are unable to provide
direction.
This means that research methods in qualitative research are unable, in principle, to show
researchers how to analyze and interpret their data with the specificity of a recipe or a map. And
because of this limitation, qualitative research methods also fail to make research more
predictable or controllable. For example, one way research methods might offer predictability or
control is by helping researchers overcome difficulties with analyzing their data. If a researcher
is performing an inductive analysis, they might struggle to “use [their] research question to
decide if the highlighted data are related to [their] question” (Percy et al., 2015, p. 80)—perhaps
because their participants were unclear in their answers or they used expressions unfamiliar to
the researcher. Unfortunately, understanding the expressions of participants, although central to
the analysis, is precisely one of the areas where research methods have nothing specific to say.
Indeed, the only way a research method might be able to offer specific instructions for
how to understand and interpret a dataset would be if the method already had already understood
the dataset. But in itself, even this would be insufficient; the method would also need to already
understand the dataset in relation to the researcher's overall question and project—it would need
to know how the data applies to the researchers’ questions, interests, and situation. That is, the
method would have to be a method for working through this specific data written by someone
who already understood the data and the reasons the researcher wanted to understand it. But of
course, this could hardly function as a general method applicable to any research question.
Indeed, this type of method would serve more as a commentary on the dataset, an unpacking of
what someone else understood in the data.
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Thus, when it comes to hermeneutic tasks, methods are unable to “[find] and [open] a
way through impenetrable and overgrown places,” as Melanchthon describes (quoted in Ong,
1958). Each research project is directed towards unique ends that cannot be known in advance,
and therefore each researcher must find and open a way through the “impenetrable and
overgrown places” of the analysis himself. Methodologists might ease this burden by passing on
wisdom won from their past research journeys, but they cannot lay out a clear path for
researchers in advance, thereby making the success of the analysis a foregone conclusion.
The Hermeneutic Circle and the Cartesian Model
The second model of method described above conceived of methods as sets of rules that
direct the consciousness of researchers. According to this model, the primary function of
research methods is to guide and constrain researchers as they analyze their data, directing them
towards logically sound decisions and away from subjectivity and bias. Typically, this is done by
helping researchers identify a clear and objective starting point for their research and then
showing them how to move step by step from this point to objective conclusions. Given the
connection between this model and the methodological philosophy of Descartes, I have been
referring to this model as the Cartesian model. As with the previous model, Cartesian methods
are meant to make the research process more controllable and predictable, but, on top of this,
they are also designed to make research more certain, objective, and unbiased.
As noted above, for methods to function in this way, they must (a) show researchers how
to arrive at a sufficiently clear and objective starting point and (b) provide directions for how to
maintain that clarity and objectivity in the subsequent steps of the method. If the starting point is
not sufficiently clear and objective—for example, if a researcher’s initial approach to a
phenomenon is infected with bias and subjectivity—then the conclusion will be suspect,
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regardless of how scrupulously the researcher has followed the other steps of the method.
Similarly, if the various steps of the method allow prejudices to influence how the data is
analyzed, then regardless of how clear and objective the starting point is, the result will not be
trustworthy. Thus, Cartesian methods require that researchers find an objective, prejudice-free
perspective on the research phenomenon; then, they require that researchers build on that
foundation step by step, always scrupulously observing that bias or subjectivity does not enter
the research process.
However, Gadamer’s analysis challenges the concept of objectivity on which the
Cartesian model depends. As Gadamer (1960/2004) shows, there is no method that would allow
an interpreter of a text to avoid “mixing in [his] own judgments and prejudices” (p. 369). As
shown above, an interpreter’s approach to a text is always structured by what he already
understands about a subject, and this, in turn, is shaped by the prejudices imparted to him by his
tradition. And, as Gadamer argues, attempting to shed this background is not only impossible; it
is not even desirable. If one were to approach a text without any presuppositions, it would not
make the text appear more clearly; as described above, it would make it incomprehensible.
Consequently, the Cartesian model does not accurately describe what occurs in qualitative
research.
To see how this is the case, one need only examine how Cartesian methods work in
practice. As described above, the Descriptive Phenomenological Method (DPM) is one such
method. The DPM is clearly a method inspired by the Cartesian model of methods, both in its
intellectual genealogy (it is based on the transcendental philosophy of Husserl, who was
explicitly inspired by Descartes’ theory of method) and in its structure. Specifically, the method
is Cartesian because it attempts to show researchers how to obtain an objective and unbiased
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vantage point on their data and then provides directions for maintaining that purity throughout
the research process.
The key to this is what Giorgi (e.g., 1997) describes as the scientific phenomenological
reduction—the attitude shift that enables researchers to obtain a clear and objective perspective
on the phenomenon they are studying. The reduction facilities this clarity and objectivity by
instructing researchers to “‘[put] aside’ or [render] ‘non-influential’ all past knowledge that may
be associated with [the phenomenon being studied]” (p. 240) as they begin analyzing their data.
For example, if a researcher were studying learning, before analyzing her data she would need to
“put aside all theories of learning as well as all personal experiences of learning” (p. 244). By
doing so, she would be able to see the phenomenon of learning freshly without the potentially
biasing effects of past experiences or presuppositions. Thus, it is the reduction that is key to the
Cartesian status of the method, because it is the reduction that provides researchers with a secure,
objective, and unbiased perspective on the phenomenon being studied.
The reduction is also key to the non-hermeneutic nature of the method, according to
Giorgi. If the researcher successfully brackets past experience or knowledge, then he approaches
phenomena directly, without the mediation of prejudices, presuppositions, or other past ideas.
This, according to Giorgi (2014), avoids the hermeneutic circle entirely; rather than the iterative,
slowly refining process of interpretive understanding, the researcher intuits the phenomenon in
the data such that the phenomenon is immediately and clearly given to his consciousness (p. 546;
for a discussion of Husserl’s concept of intuition see Hintikka, 2003). Thus, phenomenological
research proceeds on the basis of a direct and unmediated seeing, according to Giorgi, and not
the dialogic, mediated understanding arising from the hermeneutic circle.
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Clearly, there is a sense in which the phenomenological reduction is sound advice, and it
is easy to see how a version of it might be applied. As Giorgi (2009) clarifies, the reduction “is
not a matter of forgetting the past”; it merely means “that we should not let our past knowledge
be engaged while we are determining the mode and content of the present experience” (p. 92).
Thus, if a researcher were studying social anxiety, he might be aware of psychoanalytic theories
of that phenomenon while he analyzes his data, and he may even be aware of how descriptions in
the data would be interpreted via that perspective. But when he analyzes his data, it is reasonable
to expect that he could set those ideas aside, refusing to allow them to influence how he analyzes
the data. For example, he could scrupulously avoid explaining participants’ experiences by
references to psychoanalytic concepts, or he could use plain language to describe the experience
of social anxiety rather than psychoanalytic terminology.
The idea that one could set aside certain obvious fore-conceptions of the data (e.g.,
psychoanalytic fore-conceptions) is non-controversial. However, the claim that one could set
aside or render “non-influential” all past knowledge or experience of the subject at hand when
analyzing one’s data is obviously non-sensical. Gadamer’s description of descriptive
understanding shows why this is the case.
First, as Gadamer shows, even the initial read-through of the data requires a pre-existing
understanding of the research phenomenon. Were this not the case, as the researcher read the
data, he would have no way of judging which elements of participants’ descriptions were related
to the phenomenon he was investigating. Giorgi (2012) recognizes this and therefore instructs
researchers to adopt a “special sensitivity toward the phenomenon being investigated” (p. 5)
alongside the attitude of the phenomenological reduction. The reason for this is obvious: any
account will probably include many elements that could be the focal point of the analysis; a
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description of a stressful first day at school could be viewed as an example of social anxiety or
for what it shows about proper teaching praxis. Thus, it is clearly true that “a different
psychological sensitivity is required” for researching different phenomena (p. 5).
Yet, it is hard to see how the sensitivity Giorgi recommends could direct researchers to
attend to the correct elements of participants’ descriptions without also pulling in what the
researcher already understands about the phenomenon he is researching. In other words, it is
unclear how this special sensitivity could exist independently of the researchers’ experience and
knowledge of the phenomenon. Thus, there is a profound contradiction between Giorgi’s (1997)
instruction that researchers “[render] ‘non-influential’ all past knowledge” of the phenomenon
(p. 240) and the necessity of reading the data with the phenomenon in mind. If researchers really
set aside their past knowledge of the phenomenon, then they will be unable to understand their
data, yet if they read with a special sensitivity to the phenomenon, then their analysis will
inevitably be influenced by at least some of their pre-existing beliefs and experiences.
This same problem also emerges with subsequent steps of the method. For example,
following Husserl, Giorgi recommends that researchers engage in “free imaginative variation” in
order to uncover the essential features of the phenomenon. Free imaginative variation involves
imaginatively “varying specific dimensions of the given object” and observing whether that
variation causes the object to phenomenologically collapse—that is, cease to appear as that type
of object (Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003, p. 246). Those dimensions that cannot be varied without the
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object (or phenomenon) collapsing would then be considered “essential for the object to appear
as whole” (p. 246). 16
This can be a powerful technique for determining the essential attributes of an object or a
type of experience; however, it is hard to see how it is not entirely dependent on past knowledge
and experience. One cannot use this method to understand the essential features of, for example,
a cup unless one already knows what a cup is and what it is used for. Likewise, one cannot
imaginatively vary the features of depression to determine which are essential without already
having a substantive conception of what it means to be depressed. And if this is true, it is unclear
where this conception of depression could come from if not from past knowledge or experience.
For example, suppose a researcher was performing a descriptive phenomenological
analysis of depression, and he had no experience with depression. How would someone in that
position determine whether varying a dimension of depression causes the phenomenon to break
down or not? Is agitation an essential element of depression or merely a symptom of a comorbid
condition that often appears alongside depression? A researcher who did not already have
knowledge and experience with depression would have no way to know.
Thus, it is not because the researcher sheds substantive knowledge of the phenomenon
that she is able to uncover its essence; it is because the researcher approaches the phenomenon
with one set of fore-conceptions or prejudices rather than another: a first-personal, experiential,
phenomenological set of fore-conceptions, rather than, for example, a psychoanalytic set. But if

Giorgi and Giorgi (2003) demonstrate this using the example of a cup. As they demonstrate, a cup could be white
or black, made of wood or ceramics, and be round or square, but a cup cannot be made of a porous material because
the ability to hold liquids is essential to “cupness” (see, p. 246). Thus, when one imaginatively pictures a cup that is
made of, for example, cotton candy, it becomes impossible to see that object as a real cup.

16
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this is true, then the DPM does not avoid the hermeneutic circle, as Giorgi maintains; rather, the
method is carried out within the circle from start to finish.
Furthermore, while the method might help the researcher bracket some cultural or
historical perspectives that might affect the analysis, the background understanding that
structures the analysis is always structured by history and culture to some extent. The researcher
had to obtain his ideas about the phenomenon from somewhere, and, even if his understanding
were based on first-person experience (e.g., an experience of having depression), that experience
would still be structured by cultural (traditional) concepts, prejudices, ideals, and so forth. As
Gadamer (1960/2004) clarifies, there is no bracketing out the effects of history and tradition
because “history does not belong to us; we belong to it” (pp. 288-289). Indeed, the ideas passed
to us by history and tradition structure our self-understanding and our experiences before we gain
the capacity to reflect on them: “Long before we understand ourselves through the process of
self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society, and state
in which we live” (p. 289).
Thus, as Gadamer (1960/2004) argues, when it comes to hermeneutic tasks, there is no
way to “methodically [eliminate] the influence of the interpreter and his time on understanding”
(p. 342). However, if this is correct, then Cartesian methods are unable to ground qualitative
research in the ways they describe. Specifically, they are unable to provide researchers with a
clear and objective starting point—that is, a starting point free of prejudices or assumptions.
Thus, researchers using the DPM, or any other method, must always approach their subjects on
the basis of what they already understand. As Gadamer describes, human science researchers
“must reckon with the fundamental non-definitiveness of the horizon in which [their]
understanding moves” (p. 381). Qualitative researchers, like all human scientists, must wrestle
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with the fact that there is no sturdier foundation for their inquiries than the ground on which they
already stand.
This analysis is not meant to deny the utility of phenomenological research methods,
however. Phenomenological methods like the DPM can help researchers find, as Giorgi (1994)
says, “a fresh and different way of experiencing a phenomenon” (p. 212), and this can lead to
new insights, greater clarity, or deeper understanding. It is just that this “freshness” does not
consist in viewing phenomena with a consciousness purified of prejudices or fore-conceptions.
Instead, phenomenological methods help researchers see things anew by teaching them to attend
to what they already know in new ways and make explicit the implicit understandings that
already structure their experience.
The Hazards of Methods as Guidelines
The last model of methods described above conceptualized methods as general principles
or guidelines that are flexibly adapted for different analyses. While general principles do not
claim to offer the predictability, control, and objectivity of other models of method, it is at least
clear that this model is viable for qualitative research. Qualitative methods can offer general
guidelines, in other words. Indeed, based on the preceding analysis, it is now clear that
qualitative methods can only function as general principles, at least when it comes to the central,
interpretive elements of the analysis. As Macklin and Whiteford (2012) note, even relatively
straightforward principles like “‘always pursue maximum variation in your sample’ or ‘always
use interview protocols to guide questioning’… can only ever be general guidelines” because
such principles must always be “adapted to the particular demands of the research” (p. 95).
Nevertheless, in spite of their limitations, general guidelines can clearly be helpful for
qualitative researchers. For example, William James’ (1902/1982) counsel that focusing on
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“exaggerations and perversions” of a phenomenon can “[lead] to a better understanding of a
thing’s significance” (p. 22) is obviously a general principle or guideline, rather than a specific
rule or technique. Notwithstanding, this advice is insightful, and it could be profoundly helpful
for certain types of analyses. Likewise, Braun and Clarke’s (e.g., 2006; 2012) descriptions of
Thematic Analysis provide an excellent schematic of the iterative, slowly refining process of
uncovering and clarifying themes. The fact that their method cannot tell researchers specifically
what to do or help them overcome obstacles particular to their projects does not render their
methodological writings useless. Indeed, for an inexperienced researcher, their description of the
way a thematic analysis is typically carried out can be very helpful.
But there are also downsides to following research methods, even if they merely consist
of general guidelines. This is because even though methods cannot tell researchers specifically
what to do, they can direct them towards some meanings of the text at the expense of others. For
example, Thematic Analysis focuses on helping researchers identify, organize, and interpret
“patterns of meaning (themes) across a data set” (Braun & Clarke, 2012, p. 57). As with other
qualitative methods, Thematic Analysis cannot and does not provide specific direction for how to
understand and interpret particular data sets. However, it does outline a general approach to data
analysis which involves reading texts with an eye toward “patterned response[s] or meaning[s]
within the data set” (p. 82), taking notes of emerging patterns, and collecting, naming, and
sorting these patterns into themes and subthemes (p. 87).
But, while this general approach is entirely adequate for uncovering certain meanings,
there are other types of meanings that it might cause researchers to pass over. For instance,
sometimes, what might be most significant is what participants avoid saying rather than what
they explicitly state. It might be significant, for example, if sexual assault survivors failed to
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mention their assaulters when discussing their experience or if soldiers neglected to mention
being injured when giving an account of battlefield trauma. In these cases, though, researchers
might overlook meanings like these if they were merely following the method as prescribed.
In hermeneutic terms, the general guidelines of research methods function, as Hinman
(1980) describes, as “a specific anticipation of meaning, i.e., a highly formalized foreproject of
understanding” (p. 517). That is, they function as prejudices in Gadamer’s sense of the term.
With Thematic Analysis, the fore-conception is that meanings will be distributed across the
dataset in certain ways (and not others) or that meanings will emerge in certain ways during
analysis (and not in other ways). And, significantly, these fore-conceptions are compatible with
certain meanings and not others. As Palmer (1969) argues, methods thus function to “[structure]
in advance the encounter one will have with the work,” and this can be problematic because it
“runs the risk of closing to the interpreter the possibility of being led by the work itself” (p. 227).
This is not to say that codified methods necessarily close researchers off from noticing
meanings not suggested by the methods. As with any other prejudice or fore-conception, the
anticipations suggested by research methods can be revised during encounters with the texts.
Indeed, a researcher might notice meanings in her dataset that are outside of what her methods
tell her to look for, and she might find a way to work those meanings into her analysis. Codified
methods do not necessarily lead to blinkered research.
But it also might be the case that qualitative psychology’s current methodological
paradigm—which emphasizes carefully choosing and carefully following prescribed methods—
might lead researchers to hold onto the fore-conceptions suggested by their methods at the
expense of being guided by the texts they are interpreting. Tanggaard (2013) hints at this danger
when she suggests that the modern emphasis on methods “risks locking the researcher into using
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only ascribed methods while more creative thinking, digressions and the simple following of the
object of the research at the expense of procedure are not happening and/or are seen as
something to hide” (p. 411). Chamberlain (2011) also suggests that this might be the case,
arguing, for example, that “the codification of IPA… leads [researchers] to produce what the
method suggests they should”—typically a list of themes illustrated by examples (p. 50).
Chamberlain (2000) also suggests that psychologists’ preoccupation with method-following is
responsible for the shallow, formulaic, and un-reflective research that he observes in his field of
qualitative health research. Other psychologists have made similar critiques (see, e.g.,
Brinkmann, 2012; 2015; Cheek, 2008; Janesick, 1994; Kvale, 1996; van Manen, 2016).
The risk that codified methods might narrow researchers’ perspectives might be worth
taking if methods guarantee control, efficiency, or objectivity, as some methodologists claim.
However, if the preceding analysis is correct, then there is a distinct possibility that the utility of
methods is less than their potential disadvantages. If this is the case, though, then psychologists
might reasonably question how they are to pursue qualitative work at all, if not via established
and codified methods. In the final section, I will attempt to answer this question by sketching out
an alternative, non-methodological approach to qualitative investigation, and I will discuss what
this approach implies about training and cultivating qualitative researchers.
An Alternate Vision: Cultivating Hermeneutical Imagination
Thus far, the burden of this paper has been mostly negative: I have attempted to show the
limits of methods as they relate to qualitative work and to point out the negative consequences
that can emerge from an overly codified approach to research. However, it is reasonable at this
point to ask whether the implications of philosophical hermeneutics are merely negative in the
ways I have described or whether Gadamer’s philosophy has anything positive to offer to
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qualitative researchers. In other words, does Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics have any
positive implications for psychological research generally and social psychological research
specifically, or does it merely suggest to researchers what not to do?
One response to this would be to point out that showing the limits and potential
downsides of methods is beneficial in itself. As Gadamer (2007) describes, channeling an
Aristotelian metaphor, one can help an archer hit the mark by making the target more clear and
apparent and thus easier to aim at, even if it is not possible to draw the bow or aim for him. Thus,
Gadamer’s analysis might not make research easier by telling scholars specifically what to do,
but it can aid “in making present for rational consideration the ultimate purposes of one’s
actions” and help researchers “consciously [avoid] certain deviations” (p. 263). In other words,
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics helps make the essential task of research clearer by
stripping away false targets that might distract researchers and cause them to focus on the wrong
elements of research.
Nevertheless, the implications of philosophical hermeneutics for qualitative research are
not merely negative. And while Gadamer does not work out alternate modes of practice in detail,
his work points toward an alternative approach to psychological research and lays out what
attributes make for a good qualitative researcher, as well as how those attributes might be
developed, learned, and mastered. To conclude this paper, I will show what Gadamer’s
philosophical hermeneutics implies about how to go about research, I will respond to several
objections that might arise in response to the approach I am describing, and I will unpack
Gadamer’s ideas about what really makes a difference in qualitative research (if not methods).
Non-Methodological Qualitative Research
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If codified approaches to qualitative research have the limits described above, then what
might be an alternative mode of practice? How does one go about doing research if not by using
an established methodology? The answer to this question is relatively straightforward. Rather
than proceeding by selecting a pre-existing, off-the-shelf method to structure inquiry, a
researcher might simply begin to engage with the subject matter she is drawn to and allow that
subject matter to pose questions and orient her towards investigatory actions (e.g., modes of data
collection). Once she has collected her data, she carefully reviews it until she feels like she has
obtained an answer to her question, and she writes up what she feels she now understands so that
she can share her findings with the scholarly community. If she gets stuck and cannot find an
answer, she returns to a broad meditation on the subject matter—rereading her data or reading
other sources on the subject—and either refines her question or identifies new data that needs to
be collected and analyzed.
Methodological writings, including codified methods, still have a part to play in this
approach. Learning codified methods, like learning specific techniques in journalism, can
provide researchers with ideas for how to approach their phenomena. However, picking
techniques in advance (as the mainstream methodological paradigm requires) would limit
researchers’ possibilities rather than open them up. A reporter might expect that a certain
approach (e.g., combative or gracious) might work best for getting information from a source,
but it would be both unnecessary and counterproductive to expect her to commit to this in
advance or in all cases.
Methodological writings can also help researchers understand the logic of qualitative
research, how to make a good argument, how to think about issues like sampling, or how to
approach ethical dimensions of research. However, as Chamberlain (2012) describes,
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methodological ideas, including codified methods, ought to be treated like “theoretical ideas and
concepts”—they should be “drawn on and utilized” and “adapted in context” but should not be
“followed slavishly” (p. 6).
This approach to research is not novel. Methodologists sensitive to the peculiarities of
human science research have long argued that a flexible and emergent approach to research is
appropriate for studying human phenomena (see, e.g., Chamberlain 2012; Chamberlain et al.,
2011; Kvale, 1996; van Manen, 2016). This approach lines up, for example, with Moules et al.’s
(2015) masterful description of what they call “hermeneutic or interpretive inquiry” (p. 2)—an
approach explicitly grounded in Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. This approach to
research is also what was formerly the case in qualitative psychology. As noted above, scholars
like Freud, James, and Maslow seem to have employed flexible, emergent, and intuitive
approaches to research. Thus, as Brinkmann (2015) argues, the future of qualitative psychology
might be best served by looking to its past:
Perhaps the dream scenario for the future would be to return to what was previously the
case: That psychologists could ask any relevant research question and use any
methodology and technique that was needed in order to adequately address their research
question. (p. 171)
As Moules et al. (2015) describe, while this non-methodological approach emphasizes
flexibility and intuition, this does not necessarily lead to a haphazard, anything goes approach to
research. They argue that qualitative research is akin to detective work: one allows the case at
hand to determine what techniques are or are not appropriate, and procedures are adopted or
discarded based on emerging features of the case (see, pp. 62-63). The flexibility of such an
approach does not mean, though, that detectives can do whatever they want. In forensics, as in
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qualitative research, one still must present one’s findings to an audience that must be convinced,
and people are not convinced by sloppy and unreasonable modes of practice. As Moules et al.
describe,
warranted courses of action, chains of evidence, and persuasive arguments have to be
established in the course of the investigation, and all of this has to stand up to careful
scrutiny and thorough going critique. ‘Cases for’ have to be made and subjected to
rigorous argumentation. Clear, retrospective ‘accounting for’ is required [in forensics], as
it is in hermeneutic work. (p. 62)
Thus, the presence of reasonable, skeptical interlocutors constrains one’s procedural possibilities
in qualitative work.
Beyond this, though, practice is also constrained by the features and contingencies of the
phenomena one is studying as well. Thus, as Gadamer (1979) describes, “the object itself must
determine the method of its own access” (324). Psychedelic experiences have different features
than the life experiences of gang members and thus require different types of data collection and
data analysis. And beyond this, studying psychedelic experiences of this group at this time will
further structure the types of research practices that will be fruitful: some groups of users will
need to be approached in particular ways, or they might have idiosyncratic habits of describing
their experiences. Thus, as Moules et al. (2015) summarize, “practice is not so much driven by
procedure as it is by substance (die Sache), by the subject that matters” (pp. 62-63).
This style of qualitative research is also still invested in objectivity; but it rejects the
nonsensical “view from nowhere” model of objectivity common in the hard sciences—the view
that to be objective, researchers must be entirely “detached, impartial, disinterested, unbiased”
(Fine, 1998, p. 11). As Gadamer (1960/2004) notes, this view is based on “a false
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methodologism” (p. 492) and does not reflect the type of objectivity the human sciences are able
to achieve. Instead, as Fine (1998) notes, objectivity in research derives from procedures
“tailored to the subject matter under consideration” (p. 19) and calculated to be defensible to
readers and to produce trust in the results. Thus “insofar as its methods promote trust,” a research
approach is objective (p. 19), and which techniques or procedures are trustworthy is determined
by the subject one is studying (see also, Kvale, 1994, p. 153).
This approach to research might appear to some to be less rigorous than an approach
based on strict adherence to codified methods. However, as Dunne and Pendlebury (2002) note,
“true rigor entails due appreciation of the kinds of rigor that are and are not available in disparate
domains” (p. 201). Thus, as I have argued, given the type of inquiry qualitative research
inevitably is (i.e., hermeneutic inquiry), some models of rigor apply, and others do not.
In the case of qualitative research, strict adherence to codified methods merely appears
rigorous because of its association with the rigorous hard sciences (an association which is
erroneous, as I will argue below). One need only peruse the qualitative research produced via
codified methods to see that methodological rigor does not necessarily produce rigorous,
thoughtful research. And on the contrary, one need only read the works of great qualitative
researchers of the past to recognize that flexible, emergent approaches to research have their own
type of rigor that is not reducible to rigid procedures.
To paraphrase Gadamer (1960/2004), I am “quite aware that [this approach is] asking
something unusual of the self-understanding of modern science” (p. 320). Indeed, the association
between codified methods and scientific practice is so strong among most psychologists that the
approach I am recommending might be a non-starter for many researchers. Consequently, before
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proceeding it might make sense to respond to two potential objections that might be raised
against my position.
Without Methods it is Impossible to Establish Validity
The first objection might be that without codified methods, it would be impossible for
psychologists to determine the validity of qualitative research. Giorgi (2010) seems to be arguing
for this position when he asserts that the ability to “check the results of a study or to replicate it is
a scientific criterion” (p. 7), and this is dependent on the methods used to produce the results.
Thus, as with statistical modes of practice, researchers need to be able to see the processes by
which the data were transformed in order to evaluate whether conclusions are valid. Unless one
can establish that data transformations occurred without the introduction of error, one cannot
show that findings are trustworthy.
This position is based on intuitions drawn from other modes of psychological research.
As noted, statistical validity is dependent upon this type of checking. So too with experimental
research; unless one can understand the precise procedures by which an experiment was run, it is
impossible to establish whether experimental conclusions are valid inferences. However,
Giorgi’s arguments about extending this model of validity into qualitative work break down for
at least two reasons.
First, this argument conflates flexibility with a lack of transparency. It is easy to see how
a researcher could adopt a flexible and emergent approach to research and simultaneously
describe their methods such that a skeptical researcher could “evaluate the adequacy of the
methods employed” (Giorgi, 2010, pp. 6-7). Indeed, Levitt et al.’s (2017) recommendations for
designing and reviewing qualitative research emphasize that methods must show “fidelity to the
subject matter” and demonstrate “utility in achieving [research] goals” in order to produce
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trustworthy findings (i.e., valid findings; p. 10); however, they maintain that it is possible to do
this while “flexibly utilizing methods suited to the research questions” (p. 6).
Second, this position misunderstands the nature of validity in qualitative research and
how it can be assessed. In qualitative research, validity is a property of particular
interpretations—that is, it discriminates between interpretations that are “well grounded,
justifiable, strong, and convincing” (Kvale, 1994, p. 166) from those that are unjustified or
suspect. However, this is not established by reviewing the procedures by which the
interpretations were generated. If the “the harmony of all the details with the whole is the
criterion of correct understanding” (Gadamer, 1960/2004, p. 302) as Gadamer says, then whether
an interpretation is valid or not can be checked by comparing it against the texts it is meant to
illuminate. Is it a fair interpretation? Does it clarify the phenomena? Does it leave important
things out? Are there aspects of the data that seem to contradict this interpretation? Is there a
better way to characterize these texts? These types of questions are central to establishing the
validity of interpretations, not knowing the process by which interpretations were generated.
Importantly, as Taylor (1971) notes, if someone “does not ‘see’ the adequacy of our
interpretation” all one can do is “try to show him how it makes sense of the original” text (p.
6)—that is, how it “makes clear the meaning originally present in a confused, fragmentary,
cloudy form” (p. 5). As noted above, most essentially, this would involve directing the skeptical
reader to the texts of the analysis so that he can see for himself that the interpretations are
adequate. However, one might also critique the validity of interpretations based on other
considerations, for example, the adequacy of the data collected or how the interpretation
conflicts with other well-established understandings of the same phenomenon. In all these cases,
though, validity is established by comparing interpretations against the texts they are meant to
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clarify or by comparing them against what is known about the phenomenon in broader contexts;
it is not established by reviewing the procedures by which the interpretations were produced.
Qualitative Research Needs Fixed Methods to be Scientific
A second objection that might be leveled against this approach is that science is a
necessarily methodical activity and that the flexible, emergent approach to research described
here would not be appropriately scientific. Giorgi (2011) has argued for this position, asserting
that “there can be no science without the use of an established or fixed method” (p. 211) and
proper methods “[have] to have fixed steps and a fixed order” (p. 208). Indeed, for Giorgi
(2010), flexibility in research methods is not a virtue but a vice, “something to be corrected
rather than fostered,” and while it might be acceptable for researchers to work flexibly and
creatively in the early stages of a science, “once a method is accepted, it is to be strictly
followed” (p. 6). Thus, according to Giorgi’s criteria, the approach outlined above would be
essentially regressive—it would be unscientific and would plunge qualitative research backward
into the days of pre-methodological obscurity.
Giorgi’s analysis might seem plausible to some, based on a modern conception of
science, which makes its essential feature its method. However, starting in the second half of the
20th century, philosophers of science have argued that this approach is misguided and that the
essential feature of science is neither a unified “scientific method” nor rigid adherence to a fixed
method at all (e.g., Bauer 1992, Feyerabend, 1975; McGuire & Tuchanska, 2000; Polanyi, 1958;
Roth, 1987). For example, as Feyerabend (1975) has famously argued, “the idea of a method that
contains firm, unchanging, and absolutely binding principles for conducting the business of
science meets considerable difficulty when confronted with the results of historical research.” (p.
14). As evidence of this, he cites examples from the development of atomism (both in antiquity
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and in modern times), the Copernican Revolution, and the wave theory of light and shows how
these advancements “occurred only because some thinkers either decided not to be bound by
certain 'obvious' methodological rules, or because they unwittingly broke them” (p. 14).
Indeed, some of the most successful and consequential research of modern times did not
adhere to the model of scientific practice Giorgi describes. Darwin’s development of the theory
of evolution by natural selection is a case in point. Darwin’s work is obviously one of the most
influential pieces of science in the modern era, yet his approach to research was not based on
fixed methodological principles spelled out in advance. Rather, Darwin seems to have worked
flexibly, intuitively, and inductively, observing the natural world and developing his theory. In
fact, if it makes sense to talk of Darwin’s method at all, it does so only retrospectively—that is,
attempting to reconstruct the implicit logic of his investigation. He clearly did not work by
selecting an “established or fixed method” in advance of inquiry (for a discussion of Darwin’s
approach, see Cowles, 2020).
If a non-methodological approach (in the sense described above) is a viable approach to
qualitative inquiry, as I have argued, then the task of training qualitative researchers must be
significantly transformed. No longer does it make sense to train researchers by merely walking
them through the codified steps of an off-the-shelf method. Rather, qualitative research training
must focus researchers away from methodological prescriptions and toward what really matters
for qualitative research.
What Matters in Qualitative Research
Late in life, Gadamer succinctly described the methodological implications of his
philosophy in a conversation with philosopher Carsten Dutt (Gadamer et al., 2001). In that
conversation, he clarified that there is nothing wrong with learning the methods of a given field:
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“as tools, methods are always good to have” (p. 41). However, while methods are not bad to
know, he maintained that they are not what really matters for researchers:
What does the truly productive researcher do? … Are they creative because they have
mastered the methods in that field? Applying the method is what the person does who
never finds out anything new, who never brings to light an interpretation that has
revelatory power. No, it is not their mastery of methods but their hermeneutical
imagination that distinguishes truly productive researchers. (pp. 41-42)
Gadamer suggests here that method-focused disciplines, like qualitative psychology, are
in danger of misunderstanding what makes for great research. For example, one reading of the
rise of the modern methodological paradigm is that modern methods make explicit the strategies
implicitly employed by influential researchers of the past (see, e.g., Wertz et al., 2011, p. 48).
Yet this reading might suggest that it was the methods these scholars used that made their work
groundbreaking and influential, rather than the attributes of the researchers themselves. Gadamer
is saying this gets it backward. The Varieties of Religious Experience is creative and insightful
not because James (1902/1982) discovered a powerful method for analyzing data but because
James is a creative and insightful researcher. Indeed, as Robinson (2000) has argued, scientific
progress “is won by the application of an informed imagination to a problem of genuine
consequence” rather than by “the habitual application of some formulaic mode of inquiry to a set
of quasi-problems chosen chiefly because of their compatibility with the adopted method” (p.
41).
Thus, for Gadamer, what is actually essential for the human sciences is not their methods
but the knowledge, experience, and character of human science researchers—what he calls
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hermeneutical imagination. 17 Indeed, Gadamer (1960/2004) maintains that the human sciences
are entirely dependent upon this capacity. Indeed, he argues that this instinctive “psychological
tact” (p. 7) “envelops the human sciences’ form of judgment and mode of knowledge” (p. 14).
Thus, human science presupposes that scholars “[possess] the right, unlearnable, and inimitable
tact” of hermeneutical imagination (p.14). And because this capacity is so foundational, there can
even be cases, Gadamer (1994) maintains, where there is “more truth in the work of an
unscientific dilettante than in an ever so methodical evaluation of the material” (p. 26)—
provided the dilettante has a well-formed hermeneutical imagination. Regrettably, Gadamer
never systematically describes hermeneutical imagination; however, throughout his writings, he
does hint at the nature of this capacity and suggests how it might be developed.
Hermeneutical Imagination
Throughout his writings, Gadamer clarified that the psychological tact required to do
hermeneutical work is akin to the knowledge that guides decision-making in moral situations
(i.e., phronesis; see Gadamer, 1960/2004, p. 322-355; 1979). 18 Hermeneutical imagination is an
easy characteristic to spot, but it is not easy to define or systematically describe. Most
essentially, it is a special sensitivity and know-how regarding the meaning and significance of

I will follow Gadamer in referring to this as hermeneutical imagination, although I acknowledge that he does not
use the term consistently. Indeed, at various points he uses a variety of short-hands to refer to the capacity to
interpret well, describing as a psychological tact (Gadamer, 1960/2004, p. 7), a “[talent] requiring certain finesse of
mind” (p. 318), genius (p. 50), and hermeneutical know-how (Gadamer, 1979, p. 130).
17

Gadamer’s most explicit treatment of the nature of hermeneutical imagination comes through his exposition of
Aristotle’s concept of phronesis, where he clarifies that a virtue much like phronesis must be at play in interpretive
work. And while late in his career he clarified that “phronesis is the basic hermeneutical virtue” (Gadamer, 1986, as
cited in Dostal, 2022, p. 82), he never clarified the precise relationship between phronesis and hermeneutical
imagination. While some researchers have identified phronesis as the knowledge that guides qualitative practice
(i.e., identified hermeneutical imagination with phronesis; see, Macklin & Whiteford, 2012), I think there are
meaningful reasons to distinguish them. Thus, in this paper, I will refer to hermeneutical imagination as a capacity
that is of a similar kind as phronesis, but I will not collapse the two concepts into one another.
18
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human phenomena. It is the ability to understand difficult texts and to offer insightful
interpretations or the capacity to get to the heart of things and to identify what is relevant or
important.
Unfortunately for methodologists, Gadamer (1960/2004) clarifies that hermeneutical
imagination is not like the knowledge required to do mathematics (episteme) or build a chair
(techne). Mathematical knowledge and productive knowledge are fundamentally explicit and
systematic and, therefore, can be reduced to clear rules, procedures, or ideas that can be clearly
taught. Hermeneutic imagination, however, is essentially “tacit and unformulable” (p. 15) and
therefore “cannot be taught and demonstrated” (Gadamer, 1994, p. 28) in the same way one
could teach someone to do math or build a chair.
One reason hermeneutical imagination cannot be straightforwardly transmitted from one
person to another is that it is essentially a practical and contextual capacity. This means that
hermeneutical imagination is (1) an ability that determines and directs action and (2) that it is
only manifest during action, that is, in the context of particular interactions with things to be
understood and interpreted. Because of this, hermeneutical imagination is not a capacity that is
available in advance in the way that a craftsman can lay out his blueprints and strategies before
beginning a project; it is knowledge that only manifests itself “in the course of ‘hot action’”
(Smith, 1999, p. 330).
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Hermeneutical imagination is also not directly transmittable because it is uniquely
grounded in the being of the interpreter. 19 As Dunne (1993) describes, it is “not a cognitive
capacity that one has at one’s disposal but is, rather, very closely bound up with the kind of
person that one is” (p. 273). Thus, while almost any type of person could learn to build a chair or
calculate sums (provided they had the cognitive capacity to follow directions), hermeneutical
imagination, like moral judgment, requires that the interpreter be a certain type of person, that is,
possess experience and character.
By experience, I mean both immersion in the particulars of a field of inquiry over time
and the aptitudes, skills, and sensitivities that emerge from that participation. Thus, Gadamer
(1960/2004) describes hermeneutical imagination as a tact that is developed “by virtue of a
thoroughly concrete experience in everyday practice” (p. 138). More specifically, though, it is
developed by “unrelenting interaction with the subject matter” that one is studying (Gadamer,
1994, p. 28). Thus, while it might make sense to describe a tact for hermeneutic work in general,
it is probably more accurate to describe domain-specific forms of hermeneutical imagination.
Someone might, for example, have a particular genius for understanding and interpreting
emotional life, whereas someone else might be adept at understanding systems or organizations,
and these capacities would emerge from researchers’ experiences in these domains.
But Gadamer clarifies that hermeneutical imagination is not merely experience; rather, it
is being shaped by experience in specific ways. Thus, it might be possible to picture someone

As scholars have observed, Gadamer’s description of the relationship between the interpreter and the text aligns
well with Michael Polanyi’s philosophy of personal knowledge (see, 1958). As Polanyi (1967) argues, scientific
knowledge (i.e., a scientists’ knowledge of his discoveries) is “personal, in the sense of involving the personality of
him who holds it” and is associated with virtues like commitment and responsibility (pp. 24-25). (For a discussion of
the similarities between Gadamer and Polanyi see, Mulherin, 2010; Weinsheimer, 1985.)
19
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who has had extensive experience in, for example, dealing with a certain difficult type of
person—say individuals with borderline personality disorder—but who has responded to that
experience by developing a close-minded, resentful, and judgmental character. In this case, the
mere fact of brute experience is insufficient to provide them with the tact that would make them
a good scholar of personality disorders. As Dunne and Pendlebury (2002) summarize, “raw
experience is not a sufficient condition” for producing this type of knowledge; “crucially, one
must learn from one’s experience—perhaps especially from one’s mistakes—so that one’s
experience is constantly reconstructed” (p. 198).
Thus, hermeneutical imagination arises from a character that has been shaped by
experience to possess certain virtues, for example, “openness to the other” (p. 369) and goodwill
(Gadamer, 2007, p. 172). For example, successful understanding seems to require
virtues such as patience in sticking with a problem, a sense of balance that keeps both
details and ‘big picture’ in focus, a sobriety that keeps one from being easily swayed by
impulse or first impressions, a courage that enables one to persist in a truthful though
otherwise unprofitable or unpopular direction. (Dunne & Pendlebury, 2002, p. 198)
Indeed, the willingness to revise one’s fore-conceptions in light of meanings emerging from the
text seems to depend on “personal qualities and not just cognitive abilities” (p. 198): personal
qualities like humility to let oneself be corrected or charity to hear someone out.
As Dunne (1993) notes, the type of wisdom “needed here is not easily acquired” (p. 369).
However, the problem with technical, procedural approaches to research is that they attempt to
“supplant” or work around hermeneutical imagination “rather than develop it” (p. 369). At least,
it would be fair to say that most methodological introductions to qualitative research (e.g.,
textbooks, handbooks, research seminars, methodology courses) neglect the role of
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hermeneutical imagination in qualitative work. But this does not need to be the case. As I will
argue next, qualitative research training could focus on helping researchers cultivate
hermeneutical imagination rather than merely teaching them codified methods.
Teaching Qualitative Research and Cultivating Hermeneutical Imagination
If the capacity required to do qualitative research “cannot be taught and demonstrated”
(Gadamer, 1994, p. 28), as Gadamer describes, then it is reasonable to ask how educators might
help aspiring qualitative researchers learn their craft. If hermeneutical imagination cannot be
taught, in the same way that one can teach someone mathematics or woodworking, are there
ways educators could help students develop it? Gadamer does not answer this directly; however,
based on the above analysis, there are several ways teachers might help researchers cultivate
hermeneutical imagination.
Experience. An approach to education that centers on cultivating hermeneutical
imagination would first and foremost focus on providing researchers with hermeneutic
experience. As Macklin and Whiteford (2012) argue, what is most helpful in qualitative research
training is for novice researchers to “throw themselves into [qualitative research] practice”
because “they will improve in their practice of qualitative research as their experience grows”
(pp. 98-99). Indeed, as described above, Gadamer (1979) maintains that hermeneutical
imagination is acquired “by virtue of a thoroughly concrete experience in everyday practice” (p.
138). The key word here is practice. Gadamer’s point is that the type of experience that matters
here is not passive (e.g., merely being exposed to human phenomena); rather, it is experience
with the vicissitudes of hermeneutic work, that is, working through difficult texts, making sense
of them, and clearly communicating what they mean.
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Thus, aspiring researchers would perhaps be best served by a model of qualitative
research training that emphasized hands-on practice with real data rather than abstract
methodological principles. Working through a complex dataset as a class, arguing about the
meanings of passages, and sharing and getting feedback on interpretations that make sense of the
data—these are all activities that would be particularly helpful.
However, Gadamer seems to suggest that an approach to training focused on qualitative
research in general might be less helpful than it could be. Experience matters, but Gadamer also
emphasizes that the tact to interpret well is acquired “through unrelenting interaction with the
subject matter [emphasis added]” (Gadamer, 1994, p. 28). Thus, hermeneutical imagination
develops best as students immerse themselves in the subjects they intend to study, rather than
“practicing” data analysis on a subject unrelated to their interests. Thus, method classes that
focus on qualitative research in general might be helpful, but only to a limited degree; a
thoroughgoing emersion in the specifics of a particular subject would be more useful.
Thus, one implication of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is that the methodcentric model of training might be problematic in itself, and instead of trying to train all-purpose
qualitative researchers, it would make more sense to cultivate thoughtful addiction researchers or
scholars of family relationships. While working through a “practice” data set (i.e., something
assigned by a teacher for a class) might provide some helpful experience, it would not have the
same effect as having students work through their own projects because it would do nothing to
attune them to the specifics of the subjects that move them.
Consequently, perhaps the ideal case would be some minimal “methods” training
outlining basic principles of practice, then working with a mentor who is an expert in a specific
subject and diving into the nitty-gritty of ongoing projects. The point is that hermeneutic
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imagination is not merely a set of transferable, all-purpose skills; it is perhaps first and foremost
a sensitivity towards certain domains of meaning, and this sensitivity is developed by engaging
with those domains and not in the abstract.
Mentoring. As hinted above, working with an experienced researcher would also be a
powerful way to cultivate hermeneutical imagination. Indeed, as Macklin and Whiteford (2012)
argue, training “can, and arguably must be done, under the guidance of more experienced
qualitative researchers” (p. 99).
One reason for this is that an experienced researcher can help one become attuned to the
details and idiosyncrasies of a particular subject; subject experts know the writings that lay out
the major ideas of the field, and they can help a new researcher make sense of some of the
peculiarities of working with a particular population or phenomenon. For example, an
accomplished trauma researcher would be able to help a novice learn the major theories and
approaches of the field. Such an expert could also help a new researcher learn practical skills like
how to identify untrustworthy data or how to sensitively discuss traumatic events with survivors.
As Mills (1959) points out, conversation with experienced researchers can also impart a realistic
sense of how research is carried out: “only by conversations in which experienced thinkers
exchange information about their actual ways of working can a useful sense of method and
theory be imparted to the beginning student” (p. 195).
Beyond this, working with a mentor is a powerful way to develop the virtues that make
for a good researcher. As Lawn (2006) describes, “habits of character are picked up by following
the example of those already in possession of virtue,” and by emulating those with character,
“we are drawn into the moral tradition of desirable actions, generous acts, truthful acts, and so
forth” (p. 134). Thus, by observing and emulating an accomplished researcher and receiving
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feedback about their performance, a novice can begin to practice those virtues that are associated
with hermeneutical imagination.
For example, studying the attitudes and beliefs of conspiracy theorists requires certain
virtues—goodwill, patience, and charity, for example—and a powerful way to develop these
virtues would be to follow the example of a veteran researcher. One might, for example, pay
attention to how the experienced researcher handles belligerent participants and attempt to
emulate that behavior. An experienced researcher could also help a novice work through a
breakdown in practice and understand how to be more patient or open-minded in the future.
Examples. While this approach would not focus on teaching codified methods, that does
not mean that it would entirely neglect discussing methods. As Gadamer (1960/2004) maintains,
hermeneutic tasks are like moral tasks, and it can be helpful “to make an outline and by means of
this sketch give some help to moral consciousness” (p. 323). Gadamer’s point, though, is that
outlines of practice could only ever provide rough sketches of what research might look like;
each project will inevitably call for adaptation and improvisation. Thus, rather than presenting
methods as ironclad rules, this approach would present them as sketches of what the research
process might look like. In this approach, methods would be conceptualized as tools in a
toolkit—techniques that might be helpful in the same way that a painter might benefit from
learning certain brushstrokes or methods or mixing paint. But as tools, methods would not be
presented as clear-cut rules, recipes, or maps. They would always be potential tactics, only to be
applied if warranted by the situation.
However, while studying codified methods (e.g., thematic analysis or grounded theory)
might be helpful, focusing on completed projects rather than abstract principles might be more
beneficial. For example, novices might benefit from reading influential qualitative research and
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learning the process by which it was carried out, or they might benefit from hearing a scholar
describe how she carried out a successful study. This would have at least two benefits. First, it
would give students a sense of how research is actually carried out, rather than merely describing
how it could be accomplished (as codified methods do). This would help students get a sense of
the vicissitudes of practice and the flexibility and problem solving it often requires. Second,
focusing on actual research would help hone students’ sensibilities regarding what makes for
powerful research. Having exemplary research that one seeks to emulate might stimulate
hermeneutical imagination more than focusing on techniques in the abstract.
Reasoning. Finally, this approach would necessarily involve reasoning with students
about the nature and purposes of qualitative work. As Gadamer (2007) notes, moral education
might not be able to tell moral actors specifically what to do, but it can “[aid] in making present
for rational consideration the ultimate purposes of one’s actions” (p. 263), and this is the case in
qualitative research as well.
Once again, methodological writings would have a role to play in this. While
methodological principles rarely could function as concrete rules, they could still help
researchers refine their practice. Just as ethical hypotheticals can help sharpen moral judgment, it
might be helpful to contemplate and discuss, for example, what makes for a good sample, ethical
issues relating to data collection, what role ideology should play in interpretation, or the
meanings of significant terminology like phenomenological “essences.” As above, though, this
would focus on helping students understand general principles of practice, and it would be
careful not to depict these ideas as iron-clad rules.
Conclusion
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As Gadamer (1960/2004) notes, “ultimately, as Descartes himself realized, it belongs to
the special structure of straightening something crooked that it needs to be bent in the opposite
direction” (p. 580). The present argument has functioned like this, setting forth a distinctively
critical take on the role of methods in qualitative work. However, while I have downplayed the
significance and importance of methods, I am not arguing for their abolition. It is okay to talk
about methods, give methodological advice, sketch out procedures that have worked in the past,
and offer guidance about how to avoid mistakes in research. And insofar as methods contain real
wisdom—wisdom won from experience—they can help researchers.
However, scholars must be clear-eyed about what methods can do—presenting research
methods as imperatives that must be followed or as powerful tools that guarantee success
misrepresents the nature and capacity of methods. Methods cannot solve researchers' problems,
do the work for them, or show them how to interpret the data at hand; indeed, they leave the
central tasks of qualitative analyses essentially undirected. Indeed, as Robinson (2000) asserts,
somewhat provocatively, “It is only the hack or ‘hired hand’ who latches onto some textbook
method – some ‘methodology,’ as they say – and then casts about for problem trite enough to be
settled by it” (p. 41). As Gadamer (1979) describes, general knowledge of moral principles “by
virtue of its very generality, is unmindful of concrete situations and their exigencies,” and, if it is
too tightly grasped, it can “obscure the meaning of the concrete exigencies which a factual
situation could pose” to a moral actor (p. 136). As I have argued, the same is true with codified
methods.
Thus, following Schrag and Ramsey (1994), I argue that the implication of this argument
is “not so much a jettisoning of concerns about method, but rather a re-situation of
methodological inquiry against the backdrop of the ‘about which’ one is inquiring” (p. 132).
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Beyond this, I have argued that method also needs to be resituated against the backdrop of the
being of the interpreter. That is, methods should not just take into account the features of the
subject they investigate; they must also consider the finite, historical, and hermeneutic nature of
human investigators. Thus, for example, Husserlian methods require a type of purifiable
consciousness that human scientists simply do not possess; for these methods to be properly
understood and employed, they must be reconceptualized and thus re-situated.
This dissertation has followed Gadamer (1960/2004) in “[attempting] to understand what
the human sciences truly are, beyond their methodological self-consciousness” (p. xxii), and
what I hope to have established is that the modern methodological paradigm misunderstands the
type of work qualitative research inevitably is. Following Gadamer, I believe this
misunderstanding has had consequences for qualitative psychology; foremost among these has
been a “narrowing of perspective that results from concentrating on method” (p. 579).
Significantly, it is not the methods themselves that have led to this—“as tools, [emphasis added]
methods are always good to have” (Gadamer et al., 2001, p. 41). Rather, it is methods in
combination with a methodological paradigm that misrepresents their power, their capacities,
and their necessity that leads to poor outcomes.
I agree with Reicher (2000) that “the health of our discipline depends upon a willingness
to use qualitative methods when appropriate” (p. 2), and I maintain, as argued above, that this is
particularly true of social psychology. Given the unique features of social phenomena, social
psychology might have the most to gain from a greater embrace of qualitative research. But if
Gadamer is right that concentrating on method leads to a narrowing of perspective, then it will be
equally crucial for social psychologists to approach qualitative work with a clear vision of the
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nature and uses of codified methods. Only then will social psychology be able to benefit from the
full power of this approach to research.
In the conclusion to Truth and Method, Gadamer (1960/2004) briefly summarizes what
his ideas imply about the practice of research in the human sciences:
Throughout our investigation it has emerged that the certainty achieved by using
scientific methods does not suffice to guarantee truth. This especially applies to the
human sciences, but it does not mean that they are less scientific; on the contrary, it
justifies the claim to special humane significance that they have always made. The fact
that in such knowledge the knower’s own being [e.g., his experience and character]
comes into play certainly shows the limits of method, but not of science. Rather, what the
tool of method does not achieve must—and really can—be achieved by a discipline of
questioning and inquiring, a discipline that guarantees truth. (p. 506)
The term discipline is instructive here. It implies a way of doing things but also is etymologically
related to Latin terms associated with education, moral training, and being a pupil (MerriamWebster, n.d.). And this resonates with the uniquely historical, humane, and hermeneutic nature
of qualitative research and the rigorous spiritual cultivation this requires of us.

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

85
References

Allport, G. W. (1942). The use of personal documents in psychological science. Social Science
Research Council.
Allport, G. W. (1985). The historical background of social psychology. In G. Lindzey, and E.
Aronson, (Eds.), Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. I, (3rd Ed.), 1-46.
Anderson, R. (2004). Intuitive inquiry: An epistemology of the heart for scientific inquiry. The
Humanistic Psychologist, 32(4), 307-341.
Applebaum, M. H. (2011). (Mis) Appropriations of Gadamer in qualitative research: A
Husserlian critique (Part 1). Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, 11(1), 1-17.
Asch, S. E. (1987). Social psychology. Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1952)
Auerbach, C., & Silverstein, L. B. (2003). Qualitative data: An introduction to coding and
analysis. NYU Press.
Barak, A. (2020). Fusing horizons in qualitative research: Gadamer and cultural resonances.
Qualitative Research in Psychology, 19(3), 768-783.
Bauer, H. H. (1992). Scientific literacy and the myth of the scientific method. University of
Illinois Press.
Beck, B., Halling, S., McNabb, M., Miller, D., Rowe, J. O., & Schulz, J. (2003). Facing up to
hopelessness: A dialogal phenomenological study. Journal of Religion and Health, 42(4),
339-354.
Beck, T. J. (2013). A phenomenological analysis of anxiety as experienced in social situations.
Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 44(2), 179-219.
Brannigan, A. (2002). The experimental turn in social psychology. Society, 39(5), 74-79.

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

86

Brannigan, A. (2004). The rise and fall of social psychology: The use and misuse of the
experimental method. Routledge.
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative research in
psychology, 3(2), 77-101.
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2012). Thematic analysis. In H. Cooper, P. M. Camic, D. L. Long, A.
T. Panter, D. Rindskopf, & K. J. Sher (Eds.), APA handbook of research methods in
psychology, Vol. 2. Research designs: Quantitative, qualitative, neuropsychological, and
biological (p. 57–71). American Psychological Association.
Brinkmann, S. (2012). Qualitative research between craftsmanship and McDonaldization. A
keynote address from the 17th Qualitative Health Research Conference. Qualitative
Studies, 3(1), 56-68.
Brinkmann, S. (2015). Perils and potentials in qualitative psychology. Integrative Psychological
and Behavioral Science, 49(2), 162-173.
Brooks, J., McCluskey, S., Turley, E., & King, N. (2015). The utility of template analysis in
qualitative psychology research. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 12(2), 202-222.
Brown, S. D., & Locke, A. (2017) Social Psychology. In Willig, C., & Rogers, W. S. (Eds.), The
SAGE handbook of qualitative research in psychology (2nd ed., pp. 417–430). SAGE
Publications.
Buchler, J. (1961) The concept of method. Columbia University Press.
Camic, P. M., Rhodes, J. E., & Yardley, L. E. (2003). Qualitative research in psychology:
Expanding perspectives in methodology and design. American Psychological
Association.

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

87

Caputo, J. D. (1984). Husserl, Heidegger and the question of a “hermeneutic” phenomenology.
Husserl Studies, 1(1), 157-178.
Carrera-Fernandez, M. J., Guardia-Olmos, J., & Pero-Cebollero, M. (2014). Qualitative methods
of data analysis in psychology: An analysis of the literature. Qualitative Research, 14(1),
20-36.
Chamberlain, K. (2000). Methodolatry and qualitative health research. Journal of Health
Psychology, 5(3), 285-296.
Chamberlain, K. (2011). Troubling methodology. Health Psychology Review, 5(1), 48-54.
Chamberlain, K. (2012). Do you really need a methodology. QMiP Bulletin, 13(59), e63.
Chamberlain, K., Cain, T., Sheridan, J., & Dupuis, A. (2011). Pluralisms in qualitative research:
From multiple methods to integrated methods. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 8(2),
151-169.
Charmaz, K. (2015). Grounded theory. In J. A. Smith (Ed.). Qualitative psychology: A practical
guide to research methods (3rd ed., pp. 53-84). Sage.
Cheek, J. (2008). Beyond the ‘how to’: The importance of thinking about, not simply doing,
qualitative research. In K. Nielsen, S. Brinkmann, C. Elmholdt, L. Tanggard, P. Musaeus,
& G. Kraft (Eds.), A qualitative stance: Essays in honor of Steiner Kvale (pp. 203–214).
Aarhus Universitetsforlag.
Cialdini, R. B. (1980). Full-cycle social psychology. In L. Bickman (Ed.), Applied social
psychology annual (Vol. 1, pp. 21–47). Sage Publications.
Cowles, H. M. (2020) The scientific method: An evolution of thinking from Darwin to Dewey.
Harvard University Press.

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

88

Creswell, J. W., & Poth, C. N. (2016). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among
five approaches. SAGE publications.
Danziger, K. (1985). The methodological imperative in psychology. Philosophy of the Social
Sciences, 15(1), 1-13.
Danziger, K. (1992). The project of an experimental social psychology: Historical perspectives.
Science in Context, 5(2), 309-328.
Danziger, K. (2000). Making social psychology experimental: A conceptual history, 1920–1970.
Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 36(4), 329-347.
Davidson, L. (2003). Living outside mental illness. New York University Press.
Debesay, J., Nåden, D., & Slettebø, Å. (2008). How do we close the hermeneutic circle? A
Gadamerian approach to justification in interpretation in qualitative studies. Nursing
Inquiry, 15(1), 57-66.
Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.). (2017). The Sage handbook of qualitative research (5th
ed.). Sage Publications.
Descartes, R. (1985). The philosophical writings of Descartes (J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D.
Murdoch, Trans.). Cambridge University Press.
Descartes, R. (2006). A Discourse on the method of correctly conducting one's reason and
seeking truth in the sciences (I. Maclean, Trans.). Oxford University Press. (Original
work published 1637).
Diener, E., Northcott, R., Zyphur, M. J., & West, S. G. (2022). Beyond experiments.
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 17(4), 1101–1119.
Dollard, J. (1937) Caste and class in a southern town. Yale University Press.

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

89

Dostal, R. J. (2021) Gadamer’s relation to Heidegger and phenomenology. In R. J. Dostal (Ed.),
The Cambridge companion to Gadamer (2nd ed., pp. 334-354). Cambridge University
Press.
Dostal, R. J. (2022). Gadamer’s hermeneutics: Between phenomenology and dialectic.
Northwestern University Press.
Dunne, J. (1993) Back to the rough ground: Practical judgment and the lure of technique.
University of Notre Dame Press.
Dunne, J., & Pendlebury, S. (2002) Practical reason. In Brantlinger, P., & Thesing, W. B. (Eds.),
A companion to the Victorian novel (pp. 194-211). Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Eatough, V., & Smith, J. S. (2008) Interpretative phenomenological analysis. In Willig, C., &
Rogers, W. S. (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of qualitative research in psychology (1st ed.,
pp. 179–194). SAGE Publications.
Farouk, S., & Camia, C. (2022). Narrative identities of teachers from the German Democratic
Republic. Qualitative Psychology, 9(1), 45–61.
Fehér, I. M. (2016). Prejudice and pre-understanding. In N. Keane & C. Lawn (Eds.). The
Blackwell companion to hermeneutics (pp. 280-288). John Wiley & Sons.
Festinger, L., Riecken, H., & Schachter, S. (1956). When prophecy fails: A social and
psychological study of a modern group that predicted the destruction of the world.
University of Minnesota Press.
Feyerabend, P. K. (1975). Against method: Outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge. New
Left Books.

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

90

Fine, A. (1998, November). The viewpoint of no-one in particular. In Proceedings and addresses
of the American Philosophical Association (Vol. 72, No. 2, pp. 7-20). American
Philosophical Association.
Fine, G. A., & Elsbach, K. D. (2000). Ethnography and experiment in social psychological
theory building: Tactics for integrating qualitative field data with quantitative lab data.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 36(1), 51-76.
Freud, S. (2010). The interpretation of dreams (J. Strachey, Trans.) Basic Books. (Original work
published 1899)
Frost, N. (2011). Qualitative research methods in psychology: Combining core approaches (2nd
ed.). McGraw-Hill Education.
Gadamer, H. G. (1979) The problem of historical consciousness. In, Rabinow, P. & Sullivan, W.
M. (Eds.). Interpretive social science: A reader. University of California Press.
Gadamer, H. G. (1986) Gesammelte werke: Hermeneutik II: Wahrheit und methode:
Ergänzungen, register (Vol. 2). Mohr Siebeck
Gadamer, H. G. (1994). Truth in the human sciences. In Wachterhauser, B. R. (Ed.).
Hermeneutics and truth (pp. 25-32). Northwestern University Press.
Gadamer, H. G. (1995). Gesammelte werke: Hermeneutik im rückblick (Vol. 10). Mohr Siebeck.
Gadamer, H. G. (2004). Truth and method (2nd Rev. ed.; J. Weinsheimer & D. G. Marshall,
Trans.). Continuum. (Original work published 1960)
Gadamer, H. G. (2007). The Gadamer reader: A bouquet of the later writings. Northwestern
University Press.
Gadamer, H. G., Dutt, C., & Most, G. W. (2001). Gadamer in conversation: Reflections and
commentary. Yale University Press.

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

91

Gaddis, J. L. (2002). The landscape of history: How historians map the past. Oxford
University Press.
Gantt, E. E. (2005). Social psychology: Exploring alternative conceptual foundations. In B. D.
Slife, J. S. Reber, & F. C. Richardson (Eds.), Critical thinking about psychology: Hidden
assumptions and plausible alternatives (pp. 81-96). APA Books.
Gantt, E. E., & Williams, R. N. (2002). Seeking social grounds for social psychology. Theory
and Science, 3(2).
Gantt, E. E., & Williams, R. N. (2020). Methodological naturalism, saturation, and psychology’s
failure to save the phenomena. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 50(1), 84-102.
Gantt, E. E., Lindstrom, J. P., & Williams, R. N. (2017). The generality of theory and the
specificity of social behavior: Contrasting experimental and hermeneutic social science.
Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 47 (2), 130-153.
George, T. (2020) Hermeneutics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy
(Winter 2020 ed.). Stanford University.
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/hermeneutics/
Gergen, K. J., Josselson, R., & Freeman, M. (2015). The promises of qualitative inquiry.
American Psychologist, 70(1), 1–9.
Giner-Sorolla, R. (2019). From crisis of evidence to a “crisis” of relevance? Incentive-based
answers for social psychology’s perennial relevance worries. European Review of Social
Psychology, 30(1), 1-38.
Giorgi, A. (1992). Description versus interpretation: Competing alternative strategies for
qualitative research. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 23(2), 119-135.

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

92

Giorgi, A. (1994). A phenomenological perspective on certain qualitative research methods.
Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 25(2), 190-220.
Giorgi, A. (1997). The theory, practice, and evaluation of the phenomenological method as a
qualitative research procedure. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 28(2), 235260.
Giorgi, A. (2006). Concerning variations in the application of the phenomenological method. The
Humanistic Psychologist, 34(4), 305-319.
Giorgi, A. (2009). The descriptive phenomenological method in psychology: A modified
Husserlian approach. Duquesne University Press.
Giorgi, A. (2010). Phenomenology and the practice of science. Existential Analysis, 21(1), 3-22.
Giorgi, A. (2011). IPA and science: A response to Jonathan Smith. Journal of Phenomenological
Psychology, 42(2), 195-216.
Giorgi, A. (2012). The descriptive phenomenological psychological method. Journal of
Phenomenological Psychology, 43(1), 3-12.
Giorgi, A. (2014). An affirmation of the phenomenological psychological descriptive method: A
response to Rennie (2012). Psychological Methods, 19(4), 542–551.
Giorgi, A. P., & Giorgi, B. M. (2003). The descriptive phenomenological psychological method.
In P. Camic, J. E. Rhodes, & L. Yardley (Eds.), Qualitative research in psychology (pp.
242–273). American Psychological Association.
Gough, B., & Lyons, A. (2016). The future of qualitative research in psychology: Accentuating
the positive. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 50(2), 234-243.
Greenwood, J. D. (2004). The disappearance of the social in American social psychology.
Cambridge University Press.

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

93

Grondin, J. (2016). The hermeneutical circle. In N. Keane & C. Lawn (Eds.). The Blackwell
companion to hermeneutics (pp. 299-305). John Wiley & Sons.
Grondin, J. (2021) Gadamer’s basic understanding of understanding. In R. J. Dostal (Ed.), The
Cambridge companion to Gadamer (2nd ed., pp. 44-61). Cambridge University Press.
Gyllensten, K., & Palmer, S. (2007). The coaching relationship: An interpretative
phenomenological analysis. International Coaching Psychology Review, 2(2), 168-177.
Halling, S., Kunz, G., & Rowe, J. O. (1994). The contributions of dialogal psychology to
phenomenological research. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 34(1), 109-131.
Heidegger, M. (2008). Being and time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). Harper & Row.
(Original work published 1927)
Hekman, S. (1984). Action as a text: Gadamer’s hermeneutics and the social scientific analysis
of action. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 14(3), 333-354.
Henwood, K., & Parker, I. (1994). Qualitative social psychology. Journal of Community &
Applied Social Psychology, 4(4), 219–223.
Hinman, L. M. (1980). Quid facti or quid juris? The fundamental ambiguity of Gadamer's
understanding of hermeneutics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 40(4), 512535.
Hintikka, J. (2003). The notion of intuition in Husserl. Revue internationale de philosophie, (2),
57-79.
Howitt, D. (2016). Introduction to qualitative research methods in psychology: Putting theory
into practice (3rd ed.). Pearson.
Hsieh, H. F., & Shannon, S. E. (2005). Three approaches to qualitative content analysis.
Qualitative Health Research, 15(9), 1277–1288.

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

94

Ibbett, J. (1987). Gadamer, application and the history of ideas. History of Political Thought,
8(3), 545-555.
Jahoda, G. (2016). Seventy years of social psychology: A cultural and personal critique.
Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 4(1), 364-380.
James, W. (1982). The varieties of religious experience. Penguin Books. (Original work
published 1902)
Janesick, V. J. (1994). The dance of qualitative research design: Metaphor, methodolatry, and
meaning. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (pp.
209–219). SAGE Publications.
Kalinauskaitė, I., Haans, A., de Kort, Y. A., & Ijsselsteijn, W. A. (2018). Atmosphere in an
urban nightlife setting: A case study of the relationship between the socio‐physical
context and aggressive behavior. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 59(2), 223-235.
Kidd, S. A. (2002). The role of qualitative research in psychological journals. Psychological
Methods, 7(1), 126–138.
King, L. A. (2004). Measures and meanings: The use of qualitative data in social and personality
psychology. In C. Sansone, C. C. Morf, & A. T. Panter (Eds.), The Sage handbook of
methods in social psychology (pp. 173–194). SAGE Publications.
Kvale, S. (1994) Ten standard objections to qualitative research interviews. Journal of
Phenomenological Psychology 25(2), 147-173.
Kvale, S. (1996). InterViews: An introduction to qualitative research interviewing. Sage
Publications.
Larkin, M. (2015). Choosing your approach. In J. A. Smith (Ed.), Qualitative Psychology: A
Practical Guide to Research Methods (3rd ed., pp. 249–257). SAGE Publications.

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

95

Lawn, C. (2006). Gadamer: A guide for the perplexed. Bloomsbury Publishing.
Levitt, H. M., Motulsky, S. L., Wertz, F. J., Morrow, S. L., & Ponterotto, J. G. (2017).
Recommendations for designing and reviewing qualitative research in psychology:
Promoting methodological integrity. Qualitative psychology, 4(1), 2.
Levitt, H. M., Bamberg, M., Creswell, J. W., Frost, D. M., Josselson, R., & Suárez-Orozco, C.
(2018). Journal article reporting standards for qualitative primary, qualitative metaanalytic, and mixed methods research in psychology: The APA Publications and
Communications Board task force report. American Psychologist, 73(1), 26–46.
Lewin, K. (1948). Resolving social conflicts; selected papers on group dynamics. Harper.
Lyons, E., & Coyle, A. (2016) Analysing qualitative data in psychology (2nd ed.). SAGE
Publications.
MacDonald, P. S. (2000). Descartes and Husserl: The philosophical project of radical
beginnings. SUNY Press.
McGuire, J. E., & Tuchanska, B. (2000). Science unfettered: A philosophical study in
sociohistorical ontology. Ohio University Press.
Macklin, R., & Whiteford, G. (2012). Phronesis, aporia, and qualitative research. In E. A.
Kinsella & A. Pitman (Eds.), Phronesis as professional knowledge: Practical wisdom in
the professions (pp. 87-100). Sense Publishers
Madill, A., & Gough, B. (2008). Qualitative research and its place in psychological science.
Psychological methods, 13(3), 254–271.
Manton, C. (2019). Applying Gadamer's “prejudices" to a grounded theory study. Qualitative
Report, 24(9), 2151-2163.

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

96

Marchel, C., & Owens, S. (2007). Qualitative research in psychology: Could William James get
a job? History of Psychology, 10(4), 301–324.
Marecek, J., Fine, M., & Kidder, L. (1997). Working between worlds: Qualitative methods and
social psychology. Journal of Social Issues, 53(4), 631-644.
Martin, J., & Sugarman, J. (2001). Interpreting human kinds: Beginnings of a hermeneutic
psychology. Theory & Psychology, 11(2), 193-207.
Maslow, A. H. (1971). The farther reaches of human nature. Viking Press.
Merriam-Webster. (n.d.). Discipline. In Merriam-Webster.com dictionary. Retrieved June 3,
2022, from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/discipline
Messer, S. B., Sass, L. A., & Woolfolk, R. L. (1988). Hermeneutics and psychological theory:
Interpretive perspectives on personality, psychotherapy, and psychopathology. Rutgers
University Press.
Michell, J. (2003). The quantitative imperative: Positivism, naïve realism and the place of
qualitative methods in psychology. Theory & Psychology, 13(1), 5-31.
Michell, J. (2010). The quantity/quality interchange: A blind spot on the highway of science. In
A. Toomela and J. Valsiner (Eds.), Methodological thinking in psychology: 60 years
gone astray? (pp. 45-68). Information Age Publishing.
Mills, C. W. (1959). The sociological imagination. Oxford University Press.
Mortensen, C. R., & Cialdini, R. B. (2010). Full‐cycle social psychology for theory and
application. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 4(1), 53-63.
Moules, N. J., McCaffrey, G., Field, J. C., & Laing, C. M. (2015). Conducting hermeneutic
research: From philosophy to practice. Peter Lang Publishing, Inc.

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

97

Mulherin, C. (2010) A rose by any other name? Personal knowledge and hermeneneutics. In T.
Margitay (Ed.). Knowing and being: Perspectives on the philosophy of Michael Polanyi
(pp. 68-79). Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Nixon, J. (2017). Hans-Georg Gadamer: The hermeneutical imagination. Springer.
Odom Institute for Research in Social Science. (n.d.) QRSI Spotlight: ‘Sort and Sift, Think and
Shift’: Learning to Let the Data Guide Your Analysis. https://odum.unc.edu/2017/07/qrsispotlight-sort-sift-think-shift-learning-let-data-guide-analysis/
O'Neill, P. (2002). Tectonic change: The qualitative paradigm in psychology. Canadian
Psychology/Psychologie Canadienne, 43(3), 190–194.
Ong, W. J. (1958). Ramus, method, and the decay of dialogue: From the art of discourse to the
art of reason. Harvard University Press.
Packer, M. (1985). Hermeneutic inquiry in the study of human conduct. American Psychologist,
40(10), 1081-1093
Packer, M. J. (2017). The science of qualitative research (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press.
Packer, M. J., & Addison, R. B. (Eds.). (1989). Entering the circle: Hermeneutic investigation in
psychology. SUNY press.
Palmer, R. E. (1969). Hermeneutics: Interpretation theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey,
Heidegger, and Gadamer. Northwestern University Press.
Parker, I. (2004). Qualitative psychology: Introducing radical research. McGraw-Hill
Education.
Percy, W. H., Kostere, K., & Kostere, S. (2015). Generic qualitative research in psychology. The
Qualitative Report, 20(2), 76-85.

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

98

Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal knowledge: Toward a post-critical philosophy. The University of
Chicago Press.
Polanyi, Michael (1967) The tacit dimension. Anchor Books.
Polkinghorne, D. E. (2000). Psychological inquiry and the pragmatic and hermeneutic traditions.
Theory & Psychology, 10(4), 453–479.
Power, S. A., Velez, G., Qadafi, A., & Tennant, J. (2018). The SAGE model of social
psychological research. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 13(3), 359-372.
Reicher, S. (2000). Against methodolatry: Some comments on Elliott, Fischer, and Rennie. The
British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 39, 1.
Rennie, D. L. (1999). Qualitative research: A matter of hermeneutics and the sociology of
knowledge. In M. Kopala & L. A. Suzuki (Eds.), Using qualitative methods in
psychology (p. 3–13). SAGE Publications.
Rennie, D. L. (2012). Qualitative research as methodical hermeneutics. Psychological Methods,
17(3), 385–398.
Rennie, D. L., Watson, K. D., & Monteiro, A. M. (2002). The rise of qualitative research in
psychology. Canadian Psychology/Psychologie Canadienne, 43(3), 179–189.
Research Talk Inc. (n.d.) Qualitative Research Services.
http://www.researchtalk.com/qualitative-research-services/
Richardson, J. T. (1996). Handbook of qualitative research methods for psychology and the
social sciences. BPS Books.
Riley, S., Brooks, J., Goodman, S., Cahill, S., Branney, P., Treharne, G. J., & Sullivan, C.
(2019). Celebrations amongst challenges: Considering the past, present and future of the

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

99

qualitative methods in psychology section of the British Psychology Society. Qualitative
Research in Psychology, 16(3), 464-482.
Robinson, D. N. (2000). Paradigms and the myth of framework how science progresses. Theory
& Psychology, 10(1), 39-47.
Roth, P. A. (1987). Meaning and method in the social sciences: A case for methodological
pluralism. Cornell University Press.
Rozin, P. (2001). Social psychology and science: Some lessons from Solomon Asch. Personality
and Social Psychology Review, 5(1), 2-14.
Rozin, P. (2006). Domain denigration and process preference in academic psychology.
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1(4), 365-376.
Rozin, P. (2009). What kind of empirical research should we publish, fund, and reward?: A
different perspective. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4(4), 435-439.
Scanlon, J. (1977). Translator’s Introduction. In E. Husserl Phenomenological Psychology (ix–
xv). Nijhoff.
Schwandt, T. A. (1999). On understanding understanding. Qualitative Inquiry, 5(4), 451-464.
Schrag, C. O., & Ramsey, R. E. (1994). Method and phenomenological research: Humility and
commitment in interpretation. Human Studies, 17, 131-137.
Shelley, C. (2000). Epistemology and methods in individual psychology: Toward a fusion of
horizons with hermeneutics. Journal of Individual Psychology, 56(1), 59–73.
Silverman, I. (1971). Crisis in social psychology: The relevance of relevance. American
Psychologist, 26(6), 583–584.
Smith, J. A. (2015). Qualitative psychology: A practical guide to research methods (3rd ed.).
SAGE Publications.

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

100

Stam, H. J. (2006). Reclaiming the social in social psychology. Theory and Psychology, 16, 587–
595.
Stam, H. J., Radtke, H. L., & Lubek, I. (2000). Strains in experimental social psychology: A
textual analysis of the development of experimentation in social psychology. Journal of
the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 36(4), 365-382.
Tanggaard, L. (2013). Troubling methods in qualitative inquiry and beyond. Europe’s Journal of
Psychology, 9(3), 409–418.
Taylor, C. (1971). Interpretation and the sciences of man. Review of Metaphysics, 25, 3–51.
Thompson, A. R., Larkin, M., & Smith, J. A. (2011). Interpretative phenomenological analysis
and clinical psychology training: Results from a survey of the group of trainers in clinical
psychology. Clinical Psychology Forum (222), 15-19.
van Manen, M. (2016). Researching lived experience: Human science for an action sensitive
pedagogy (2nd ed.). Routledge.
Weinsheimer, J. C. (1985) Gadamer's hermeneutics: A reading of truth and method. Yale
University Press.
Wertz, F. J. (2011). The qualitative revolution and psychology: Science, politics, and ethics. The
Humanistic Psychologist, 39(2), 77-104.
Wertz, F. J. (2014). Qualitative inquiry in the history of psychology. Qualitative Psychology,
1(1), 4-16.
Wertz, F. J., Charmaz, K., McMullen, L. M., Josselson, R., & Anderson, R. (2011). Five ways of
doing qualitative analysis: Phenomenological psychology, grounded theory, discourse
analysis, narrative research, and intuitive inquiry. Guilford Press.

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

101

Willig, C. (2012). Qualitative interpretation and analysis in psychology. McGraw-Hill
Education.
Willig, C. (2013). Introducing qualitative research in psychology (3rd ed.). McGraw-Hill
Education.
Willig, C. (2015) Discourse analysis. In Smith, J. A. (Ed.), Qualitative psychology: A practical
guide to research methods (3rd ed., pp. 143-167). SAGE Publications.
Willig, C. (2017) Interpretation in qualitative research. In Willig, C., & Rogers, W. S. (Eds.), The
SAGE handbook of qualitative research in psychology (2nd ed., pp. 274–288). SAGE
Publications.
Willig, C., & Rogers, W. S. (2008) Introduction. In Willig, C., & Rogers, W. S. (Eds.), The
SAGE handbook of qualitative research in psychology (1st ed., pp. 1–12). SAGE
Publications.
Willig, C., & Rogers, W. S. (Eds.). (2017). The SAGE handbook of qualitative research in
psychology (2nd ed.). SAGE Publications.
Wrathall, M. A. (2021). Interpretation (auslegung). In M. A. Wrathall (ed.). The Cambridge
Heidegger Lexicon (pp. 425-428). Cambridge University Press.
Wundt, W. (1900) Volkerpsychologie, 1. Engelman.
Yanchar, S. C. (2015). Truth and disclosure in qualitative research: Implications of hermeneutic
realism. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 12(2), 107-124.
Yarkoni, T. (2019). The generalizability crisis. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1-37.
Zimbardo, P. G., Haney, C., Banks, W. C., & Jaffe, D. (1974). The psychology of imprisonment:
Privation, power and pathology. In Z. Rubin (Ed.), Doing unto others: Explorations in
social behavior (pp. 61–73). Prentice Hall.

